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Capital provides the engine for growth in any economy, whether developing or
developed, and is by its nature a scarce and costly resource, especially for developing coun-
tries2 where resources are short and financial systems evolving and fragile. For these rea-
sons, developing countries are increasingly acting to open their financial systems and seek
out sources of foreign capital, in many cases as the result of policies directed by internation-
al financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), as well as by devel-
oped countries such as the United States, and regional processes such as the European
Union and the NAFTA.
This quest for capital, however, may not be without its drawbacks, as has been
recently and graphically demonstrated by Mexico's financial problems beginning in
December 1994 and arguably continuing to the present. Mexico, considered a leader
among the LDC world, had vigorously pursued just these sorts of policies and had in fact
succeeded in encouraging large amounts of foreign capital to flow into its financial system.
Due to external factors such as rising U.S. interest rates and the new mobility of interna-
tional capital flows, as well as internal factors such as perceived political instability, Mexico's
economy has been severely set back by a significant liquidity crisis, subsequently termed the
Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95. The Mexican Peso Crisis has caused havoc in the Mexican
economy and also negatively impacted the domestic capital markets of many other emerg-
ing economies, especially in Latin America, but also throughout the entire world (popularly
dubbed "the Tequila Effect"). Due to perceptions of Mexico's leadership position among
LDCs, and to U.S. policy pressures, a massive international rescue package was assembled in
1995 to help Mexico to weather its liquidity crisis, to prevent contagion to other LDCs, and
to stave off a potential debt crisis.
In general terms, Mexico experienced what has been termed a "capital surge", both
as initial capital flow into an economy in response principally to favourable foreign investor
perceptions, with a resulting outward surge back out in a very short time on the advent of
an unexpected tm of events, as with the Mexican devaluation of the peso in December
1994. While the domestic problems in Mexico were severe, the problems were not and are
not unique. For this reason, regulators in Mexico and in other emerging economies can
learn from the Mexican experience and perhaps plan accordingly. Further, the Peso Crisis
underlines the need for a coherent international response to similar problems likely to
develop in other emerging markets in the future, given that the highly mobile nature of
international capital flows is unlikely to slow and in fact may increase.
This article seeks in general terms to address these issues in terms of the Mexican
Crisis and the reactions that have followed. The first section discusses the changing pattern
of world capital flows, especially to emerging markets. The second section provides a brief
overview of the development of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95 and the international
and domestic responses thereto. The third section discusses the implications of the Crisis in
2. The terms "developing countries', emerging markets", and "less developed countries" (LDCs)
will be used throughout to refer to countries in the process of attempting to attract foreign
investment to their economies through domestic reforms in the interests of encouraging
domestic development with no distinction made between the terms The terms are by their
nature imprecise, but can generally be seen only to exclude the developed economies of Europe,
North America, and Japan.
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the broader terms of domestic and international financial regulation. The fourth section
deals with the relationship between liquidity crises and debt crises and summarizes the vari-
ous problems and proposals, both from a sovereign and a private point of view. Finally, the
article condudes with a few lessons and recommendations from the Crisis for financial
market regulation.
I. The Quest for Capital and the Development of International Capital Markets.
Capital flows to developing countries have increased significantly in recent years,
augmenting the possibility that these countries will experience growing financial instability
as LDC governments and private sector firms increasingly rely on volatile capital invest-
ments that can rapidly be withdrawn.3 Due to a number of factors, induding measures to
open their economies to foreign investment, some LDCs experienced significant inflows of
capital during the early half of the 1990s, with capital flows4 increasing from $39.8 billion in
1990 to a high of $154.7 billion in 1993 before slowing to $125.2 billion in 1994.5 Figures
for 1995 are expected to show that total capital flows to emerging markets, including the
economies in transition of Central and Eastern Europe, reached nearly $230 billion -
despite the significant impact of the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis. 6
The history of cross-border capital flows teaches caution: at irregular intervals
over the last two centuries, public and private sector investment in developing countries has
been received with enthusiasm by the international capital markets. The 1820s, the 1880s,
the years before World War I, the 1920s, and, most recently, the 1970s, were all periods of
massive international lending to developing countries; however, each lending boom was
usually followed by a period of painful retrenchment, disillusionment, and recrimination.
The last major series of financial problems started in August 1982 when Mexico dedared a
moratorium on the repayment of certain categories of its external debt. In the following
decade, $400 billion or so of debt obligations were repeatedly rescheduled and, in the end,
partially written off under the auspices of the so-called Brady Initiative, and in fact this ini-
tiative is still not complete in some countries.7
As the figures above indicate, even though the final debris has not been cleared in
the wake of the 1982 Debt Crisis, cross-border capital flows are once again in vogue, with
aggregate net long-term resource flows to developing countries from private sources
3. See generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETs: DEVELOPMENTS,
PROSPECTS, AND POLICY ISSUES (Aug 1995) [hereinafter INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS].
4. Capital flows include net foreign direct investment, net portfolio investment, and bank lending
5. INT'L CAPrrAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 2-3, esp Table 1.
6. Anthony Rowley, Record Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, BUSINESS TIMmS, Sept 11, 1996, at I
(citing IMF estimates).
7. See generally, Rory MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305 (1995)
(discussing the background of the 1980s debt crisis); Philip J. Power, SOvEREIGN DEr. THE RISE
OF THE SECONDARY MARKET AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE R.STmUCrURINGS, 64 FoRDam L
Rav. 2701 (1996). As of December 1995, Panama, Peru, and Russia, among others, had not yet
finalised comprehensive commercial bank debt rescheduling packages. Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-
Border Lending- What's Different This Time? 16 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 44 (1995), at 46.
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increasing roughly fourfold over the five-year period since 1989.8 Importantly, recent capi-
tal flows to developing countries have been increasingly concentrated in portfolio invest-
ments.9 Net portfolio flows to developing countries increased more than thirteen-fold
from $6.5 billion in the period 1983-89 to $88.3 billion in 1993, before decreasing to $61.7
billion in 1994.10 Bond placements by developing country borrowers aggregated approxi-
mately $59.3 billion in 1993, compared to $6.3 billion in 1990.11 One London-based secu-
rities dealer calculated that $160 billion of emerging market equity shares were held by
international investors in 1994, whereas in 1987 the number was $2.4 billion.12 In Western
Hemisphere LDCs especially, capital flows were more concentrated in yield-sensitive, liquid
portfolios, with these investments accounting for 66 percent of inflows to these countries
between 1990 and 1994, as compared to foreign direct investment (FDI) which only repre-
sented 30 percent.13
These increased capital flows were the result of several factors: 14 (i) many devel-
oping countries restructured their commercial bank debt and implemented sounder
macroeconomic policies as well as structural reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s, includ-
ing financial sector reforms such as placing fewer restrictions on capital flows; (ii) cross-
border securities and banking transactions became less costly and more accessible, due to
increases in technology and financial inovations; (iii) institutional investors, i.e. mutual
funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and banks and securities firms engaged in pro-
prietary trading, diversifying their portfolios internationally due to changes in investment
theory;15 and (iv) interest rates fell in industrial countries, thereby increasing the attractive-
ness of higher yields in LDC markets. These factors are likely to remain prevalent in inter-
national financial markets in coming years, and if anything, as estimates of capital flows to
developing countries in 1995 indicate, the trend towards foreign investment in developing
countries will continue to increase. The experience of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95,
however, suggests that these sorts of capital flows can have potentially devastating effects on
an LDC economy if these flows suddenly reverse.
8. See WoRLD BANK, 1 WoRLD BANK DEBT TABLES 1994-95, at 7, Table 11 (1994).
9. Portfolio capital flows consist of international placements of bonds, issues of equities in inter-
national markets, and purchases by foreigners of stocks and other financial market instruments
in developing countries' domestic markets INT'L CAPITAL MARKErs, supra note 2, at 35.
10. Id. at 3, Table 1. Estimates indicate that these sorts of flows increased significantly again in 1995
-much to the surprise of the IMF and many observers. See Rowley, supra note 6, at 1.
11. 'Capital Flows to Developing Countries" in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at
42, Table Al.
12. Stephen Fidler, A Bubble Borne Along on a Wave of Money, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at 15.
13. FDI comprised a much higher percentage of capital flows to the East Asian countries See INT'L
CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 2-3.
14. See id at 3-4.
15. In 1993, assets under management by institutional investors in major industrial countries were
approximately $ 13 trillion, with US. institutional investors accounting for more than 2/3 of
this total. Id at 4, n.4.
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II. The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-1995.
The evidence suggests that the origins of the Peso Crisis can be found in the inter-
play of a number of complex financial, economic, and political factors that developed in the
period prior to December 1994.16 According to an analysis by the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO), 17 Mexico's financial crisis originated in the growing inconsistency in 1994
between Mexico's monetary and fiscal policies and its exchange rate system. Due in part to
an upcoming presidential election, Mexican authorities were reluctant to take actions in the
spring and summer of 1994, such as raising interest rates or devaluing the peso, that could
have reduced these inconsistencies. These fundamental policy inconsistencies were exacer-
bated by the Mexican government's response to several economic and political events that
created investor concerns about the likelihood of a currency devaluation and generally
reduced investor confidence in the political and economic stability of Mexico. In response
to these investor concerns, the Mexican government issued large amounts of short-term,
dollar-indexed notes (tesobonos), so that by the end of November 1994,18 Mexico had
become particularly vulnerable to a financial market crisis because its foreign exchange
reserves had fallen to $12.9 billion,19 while it had tesobono obligations of $28.7 billion
maturing in 1995.20
16. See generally, Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, in INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 53-
64; William A Lovett, Lessons from the Recent Peso Crisis in Mexico, 4 TuL J. INT'L & COMP. L.
143 (1996); Edwin M. Truman, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for International Finance,
82 FED. RES. BULL. 199 (Mar. 1996); Magda Kornis, The Peso Crisis Revisited, 5 NO. 4 MEx.
TRADE & L. REP. 14 (Apr. 1, 1995); idem., Financial Crisis in Mexico, 5 NO. 2 MEX. TRADE & L.
REp. 5 (Feb. 1, 1995). See also, GAO, MEXico's F IAL CmsIs, infra note 17.
17. As a result of the US. commitments resulting from the Peso Crisis, the U.S. General Accounting
Office ("GAO") prepared a comprehensive report on Mexico's 1994-95 financial crisis at the
request of the Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, James A.
Leach. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORI MEXICO'S FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ORIGINS, ASSISTANCE, AND INITIAL EFFORrs To RECOVER (GAO/GGD-96-56, Feb. 23, 1996)
[hereinafter MExico's FINANCIAL CRISIS). In preparing the report, the GAO interviewed all
major particpants from all entities involved, as well as significant private participants, and
reviewed substantially every available piece of information regarding its mandate.
18. During October and November, high-level US. officials cautioned Mexican officials that the
peso seemed overvalued and indicated that it was risky to continue the existing exchange rate
policy. U.S. officials, however, were undecided about the extent to which the peso was overval-
ued and if and when financial markets might force Mexico to take action. Moreover, Federal
Reserve and Treasury officials apparently did not foresee the magnitude of the crisis that even-
tually unfolded. See MExico's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 17, at 77- 109.
19. Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 56.
20. Id. at 61, Table 1.3.
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A. THE ORIGINS OF THE MEXICAN CRISIS.
In a broad sense*, policy decisions that Mexican financial authorities took in 1994
need to be considered in the context of Mexico's recent financial and economic history.
From the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, Mexico was caught in a destructive cycle of
inflation and currency devaluations that seriously set back the country's economic develop-
ment and eventually culminated in the nationalization of the Mexican banking system in
1982. Further, prior to the 1994 Peso Crisis, Mexico had experienced several financial crises
since 1976 and on a number of occasions had received U.S. financial assistance to assist it in
dealing with such crises as well as with other difficulties. Prior to 1994, Mexico's last major
financial crisis occurred in 1982, when Mexico was unable to meet its obligations to service
$80 billion in mainly dollar-denominated debt obligations to U.S. and foreign banks.2 1
By the late 1980s, however, Mexico had largely resolved its debt crisis and was able
to resume economic growth, although it continued to rely to a great extent on foreign
investment to finance such growth. Since 1988, Mexico has instituted comprehensive
reforms in an effort to make its economy more open, efficient, and competitive, and has
sought to address both domestic and international restrictions that limited its economic
growth. Most importantly, to attract foreign capital, the Mexican government undertook
major structural reforms in the early 1990s designed to make its economy more open to
foreign investment. These reforms included privatizing many state-owned enterprises,
removing trade barriers, removing restrictions on foreign investment, and reducing infla-
tion and government spending.
In 1994, Mexico entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
with the U.S. and Canada, further opening Mexico to foreign investment and bolstering for-
eign investor confidence because investors perceived that with the signing of the NAFTA,
Mexico's long-term prospects for stable economic development were likely to improve.22
Finally, in 1994, Mexico became the twenty-fifth member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), thereby apparently signalling its full membership
in the world economy and its position as a leader in the LDC world.23
21. See MExico's FINANCIAL CRisis, supra note 17, at 29-3 1. The Bank of Mexico, Mexico's central
bank, ran out of foreign currency reserves following the 1982 oil price drop, and in August
1982, Mexico temporarily suspended repayment of principal on its foreign debt, thus signalling
the beginning of the 1982 Debt Crisis. In September, the banking system was nationalised, and
strict exchange controls were put in place. Id. The Mexican default signalled the beginning of
the Debt Crisis of the 1980s. See generally, Stephany Griffith-Jones & Osvaldo Sunkel, DEBT
AND DEVELOPMENT CRIUSES IN LATIN AMERICA: THE END OF AN ILLUSION (1986) and sources cited,
supra note 7.
22. For an excellent analysis of the NAFTA provisions and implications, see generally, Judith H Bello,
Alan F. Holmer & Joseph J. Norton (eds.), THE NoRTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. A NEw
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS (1994).
23. Mexico was formally invited to become a member of the OECD on 14 April 1994. See
Christian Schricke, Mexico, 25th Member of the OECD, 188 OECD OBSERVER 4 (June 1994)
(analyzing the accession process).
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The flow of capital to and from Mexico over the past decade serves to illustrate the
effect of its various actions on the perceptions of investors, both foreign and domestic. 24
Between 1983 and 1989, Mexico experienced net capital outflows' of $15 billion, reflecting
the impact of the 1982 Debt Crisis, but this reversed to net inflows of $102 billion between
1990 and 1994, signalling the perceived effectiveness of its domestic and international
actions. 25 The importance of Mexico in terms of its position as a leader among LDCs can
be seen from its significance in world capital flows: in 1993, Mexico received $31 billion of
capital inflows - accounting for 20 percent of net capital flows to all LDCs. 2 6
As this evidence suggests, at the beginning of 1994, Mexico was experiencing a
boom in foreign investment, related in part to investors' perceptions that Mexico's econo-
my was fundamentally strong, and further bolstered by the approval of NAFTA. 27 A sub-
stantial part of the financial inflow, however, was in the form of equity and debt portfolio
investments that could be withdrawn quickly, especially as the result of declines in
investor confidence.
The first significant drop in investor confidence in Mexico in 1994 and the related
drop in Mexican foreign currency reserves occurred following the unrest in the state of
Chiapas in January and the assassination of Mexican presidential candidate Luis Donaldo
Colosio on March 23, 1994.28 As a result, Mexico's foreign currency reserves dropped from a
high of $29.3 billion at the end of February to $25.9 billion at the end of March to $17.7 bil-
lion by the end of April.2 9 On March 24, U.S. authorities agreed to make a short-term credit
facility available to Mexico, and the peso was allowed to depreciate approximately 1 percent
against the dollar, combining with a 7 percent devaluation that had taken place in the month
preceding the assassination.30 Further, in April 1994, in connection with the establishment
of the North American Financial Group, a consultative body consisting of the finance minis-
ters and central banks of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, a trilateral agreement was established
to make available a short-term credit facility of $6 billion from the U.S. and Can$1 billion
from Canada. 31 As well, the Bank of Mexico increased domestic interest rates from 10.1 per-
cent on March 23 to 17.8 percent one month later on short-term (91-day), peso-denominat-
ed Mexican governifient notes (cetes) in an attempt to stem the outflow of capital.32
In spite of higher interest rates, investor demand for cetes continued to lag, and
investors were demanding higher interest rates on new issues because of their perception
that the peso would eventually be subject to a relatively large devaluation. Options available
24. Domestic flows take the form of flight capital, which flows out of and back into an economy
such as Mexico with remarkable speed For an interesting analysis of the magnitude of flight
capital in Latin America and other emerging economies, see generally, Rudy Naylor, HOT
MONEY AND THE POLITICS oF DEBT (1994).
25. INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 2-3.
26. Id at 2.
27. For an analysis of capital flows to Mexico in the period preceding December 1994, see Jos6
Angel Gurria, Capital Flows: The Mexican Case, in Ricardo French-Davis & Stephany Griffith
Jones, COPING WITH CAPITAL SURGES: THE RETURN OF FINANCE TO LATIN AMERICA 189 (1995).
28. See MExico's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 17, at 49-51.
29. Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 56-57.
30. See MEXIco's FINANCIAL CRISIs, supra note 17, at 51-60.
31. Id.
32. Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 56.
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to the Mexican government at this time included: 33 (i) offering even higher interest rates
on cetes, (ii) reducing government expenditures to reduce domestic demand, decrease
imports, and relieve pressure on the peso; or (iii) devaluing the peso. From the perspective
of the Mexican authorities, the first two options were unattractive in a presidential election
year because they could have led to a significant downturn in economic activity and could
have further weakened Mexico's banking system. The third option, devaluation, was also
unattractive since Mexico's success in attracting foreign investment depended significantly
on its commitment to maintaining a stable exchange rate, both from the standpoint of per-
ceptions of international investors and in order to continue to reduce the rate of inflation,
especially since a stable exchange rate had been an essential ingredient of long-standing
agreements between labor, government, and business, with the perception being that these
agreements were necessary to ensure continuing domestic stability.
Rather than adopt any of these options, the government chose, in the spring of
1994, to increase its issuance of tesobonos, reasoning that since tesobonos were dollar-
indexed, holders could avoid losses that would otherwise result if Mexico subsequently
chose to devalue its currency, and thereby encouraging investment by effectively transfer-
ring foreign exchange risk from investors to the Mexican government As a result, tesobonos
proved attractive to foreign investors.34
The result of this decision, however, increased Mexico's vulnerability to a financial
market crisis as tesobono sales rose because many tesobono purchasers were portfolio
investors who were very sensitive to changes in interest rates and risks. Further, tesobonos
had short maturities, increasing the threat of changes in contract overflows because
investors might not roll them over if investors perceived either an increased risk of a
Mexican government default or higher returns elsewhere. While this was not necessarily the
best choice in hindsight, Mexico's foreign exchange reserves did in fact stabilise at a level of
about $17.7 billion during the period from the end of April through August, when the
Mexican presidential elections came to a conclusion and at which time the Mexican author-
ities anticipated that investment flows would once again increase.35
Following the election, however, foreign investment flows did not recover to the
extent expected by Mexican authorities, in part because peso interest rates were allowed to
decline in August and were maintained at that level until December.36 During the fall of
1994, it became increasingly dear to some officials in Mexico, the U.S., and the IMF, that
Mexico's mix of monetary, fiscal and exchange policies needed to be adjusted; however, no
action was taken. 37 The current account deficit worsened during the year, partly as a result
of the strengthening of the economy related to a moderate loosening of fiscal policy, in turn
motivating a step up in domestic lending.38 Further, imports had surged as the peso
33. See MExico's FINANCIAL CRisis, supra note 17, at 60-66
34. Between January and November 1994, tesobonos rose from 64% to 70.2% of total foreign
investment in Mexican government securities. See Id., at 60-66, esp. Table 2.12 (citing data
from the Bank of Mexico).
35. Id. See also, Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 54-56.
36. MExico's FINANCIAL CRisis, supra note 17, at 66-73.
37. See generally, id at 76-109. Overall, the GAO's analysis suggests that the U.S. knew of Mexico's
problems, but did not think the outcome would be so severe, while IMF simply did not have
sufficient information to gauge the extent of the problem or its possible impact. Id.
38. See MEXIco's FINANcIAL CRsIS, supra note 17, at 66-73.
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became increasingly overvalued, and Mexico had become heavily exposed to a run on its
foreign exchange reserves as a result of substantial tesobono financing. 39 Moreover, U.S.
interest rates became increasingly attractive during this period, thereby diverting capital
flows away from Mexico.4°
In the middle of November 1994, Mexican authorities had to draw down foreign
currency reserves in order to meet demands for dollars, at least partially in response to fur-
ther increases in U.S. interest rates.4 1 In late November and early December, renewed fight-
ing in Chiapas and an unfolding scandal surrounding the September 1994 assassination of
PRI Secretary General Francisco Ruiz Massieu renewed apprehensions among investors
regarding Mexico's political stability, which were compounded further with the release of
government figures anticipating a higher current account deficit on December 9, 1994, but
without an announcement of any alteration of exchange rate policy. 2 These factors led to a
further loss of confidence among investors, increased redemptions of Mexican securities,
and resulted in a significant drop in foreign exchange reserves, to approximately $10
billion. 43 At the same time, Mexican government officials continued to assure investors that
the peso would not be devalued even though Mexico's outstanding tesobono obligations had
reached $30 billion.44
On 20 December, Mexican authorities sought to relieve pressure on the exchange
rate by announcing a widening of the peso/dollar exchange rate band, effectively devaluing
the peso by approximately 15 percent-A5 The government, however, did not announce any
new fiscal or nionetary measures to accompany the devaluation.46 This combination
resulted in an additional loss of $4 billion in foreign reserves on December 20-21, forcing
the Mexican government to freely float its currency on December 22Y The discrepancy
between the stated exchange rate policy of the Mexican government throughout most of
1994 and its devaluation of the peso on December 20, along with its failure to announce
any appropriate economic policy measures, significantly reduced investor confidence in the
newly elected government and increased fears that default was imminent Consequently,
downward pressure on the peso continued, and by early January 1995, institutional
investors realised that tesobono redemptions could soon exhaust Mexico's reserves and, in
the absence of external assistance, that Mexico might default on its dollar-indexed and dol-
39. Outstanding tesobono obligations increased from $ 31 billion at the end of March to $ 29.2 bil-
lion in December. Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 60-62.
40. Between January 1994 and November 1994, US. 3-month Treasury bill yields rose from 3.04o
to 5.45%. MExico's FINANCIAL Cmisis, supra note 17, at 56.
41. On 15 November, the Fed raised the federal funds rate by 3/4 of a percentage point. Id.
42. MExico's FiNANCIAL Ciusis, supra note 17, at 66-73.
43. Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 57, Table 18. Interestingly, most of the
pressure during this period came from the funds of Mexican nationals leaving the country
INT'L CAPITAL MARm s, supra note 3, at 7-8; see MExico's FINANC AL Cisis, supra note 17, at 66-
73.
44. MEXICO'S FINANCIAL CRIsIs, supra note 17, at 66-73.
45. It is generally agreed that the devaluation was badly mishandled.
46. An example would have been an increase in interest rates See generally, Policy Responses to
Previous Surges of Capital Inflows, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 80, supra note 3.
47. INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 57.
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lar-denominated debt - exacerbated by the fact that information beginning to emerge on
Mexico indicated that its reserves were lower than had generally been believed. 48
The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95 was now full-blown, and at this point, Mexico
was forced to turn to international sources for assistance.
B. THE INTERNATIoNAL SrATIoN: THE TEQUIlA EFFECr.
Immediately after the Mexican devaluation, most of the larger Western
Hemisphere LDCs experienced varying degrees of turbulence in their foreign exchange
markets and registered significant declines in their equity markets.49 Stock market indexes
for emerging markets, compiled by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) showed
that markets in Argentina and Brazil in particular suffered heavy trading losses immediately
after the Peso Crisis.50 Once the international assistance package was announced 51 and the
initial reaction subsided, investors began to discriminate significantly against countries such
as Argentina and Brazil which were viewed as having the same general characteristics that
afflicted Mexico; namely:52 (i) low savings rates, (ii) large current account deficits, (iii)
weak banking systems, and (iv) significant volumes of short-term debt. While the overall
international efforts were significant in reducing the ultimate contagion effect, the resulting
lessons taught by international investors are instructive for LDC policies.
C. RESPONSES TO THE MEXICAN PESO CRISIS.
I. International Assistance.
Although the Treasury, the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed), and the IMF purportedly
did not anticipate the magnitude of the Peso Crisis, they soon concluded that outside assis-
tance was required to prevent Mexico's financial collapse and to prevent the spread of the
crisis to other LDCs. Beyond its direct impact on LDC economies, officials viewed the
Crisis as a threat to market-oriented economic reforms that the IMF and the U.S. had urged
LDCs to adopt 53
48. Id. Mexico had not announced its declines in reserves in November until after the devaluation
of the peso in December. Evolution of the Mexican Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 56.
49. See INT'L CAPITAL MARKETs, supra note 3, at 6-7 See also, section 1I.C., infa.
50. MExico's FINANcIAL CRISIS, supra note 16, at 112-13, Tables 41-4.2. See Evolution of the Mexican
Peso Crisis, supra note 16, at 64-69.
51. See infra, Section IC.
52. INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARrm, supra note 2, at 6-7.
53. According to the Secretary of the Treasury, as well as government and industry analysts, Mexico
has been a paradigm for countries that are striving to put inward-looking, state-controlled
models of economic development behind them and move to free market models The Secretary
also noted that new prosperity, based on open markets, encouraging investment, and privatisa-
tion of state-controlled industries, is beginning to be realised in these emerging market
economies. Other U.S. government officials stated that they believed a spread of Mexico's
financial difficulties to other emerging markets could have halted or even reversed the global
trend toward market-oriented reform and democratisation. MExico's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra
note 17, at 110-114.
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As a result, President Clinton announced a U.S. package of loan guarantees of up
to $40 billion for Mexico on 12 January 1995; however, doubts regarding Congressional
approval led to its ineffectiveness and withdrawal. Subsequently, on 31 January 1995,
President Clinton announced a $48.8 billion multilateral assistance package. Under this
package, the U.S. would provide up to $20 billion to Mexico through the use of the
Exchange Stabilization Facility (ESF) and the Federal Reserve swap network. 54 On 1
February, the IMF approved an 18-month standby arrangement for Mexico of up to $17.8
billion. In addition, other countries, under the auspices of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), agreed to provide a short-term facility of $10 billion,55 and Canada had
already provided $1 billion in December.5 6
The U.S. and international response to the Peso Crisis was one of the largest multi-
lateral economic assistance packages ever extended to any one country. The objectives,
then, of the U.S. and IMF assistance packages, following the December devaluation and the
subsequent loss of confidence in the peso, were twofold: first, to help Mexico overcome its
short-term liquidity crisis, and second, to limit the adverse effects of the Mexican crisis
spreading to the economies of other emerging market nations and perhaps beyond.57
Along the same lines, the stated purpose of the U.S. assistance package was "to assist Mexico
in stabilizing its exchange and financial markets by providing resources to be used in such
manner as to facilitate the redemption, refinancing or restructuring of Mexico's short-term
debt obigations..."58 Some observers opposed any U.S. financial assistance to Mexico, argu-
ing that investors should not be shielded from financial losses, and that neither the danger
posed by the spread of Mexico's crisis to other nations nor the risk to U.S. trade, employ-
ment, and immigration were sufficient to justify the assistance. 59 As can be seen by the U.S.
response, U.S. officials disagreed.
54. A swap arrangement provides for temporary exchanges of currencies between participating
countries Partners in the arrangement can draw on one another's currency by supplying their
own currency up to an agreed amount. The swap is usually reversed within a short period of
time, but may be rolled over.
55. In early January, BIS announced a $5 billion faculty, later increased to $10 billion. These funds
were short-term and have not been drawn upon by Mexico.
56. Argentina, Brazil and a group of international commercial banks were also to provide funds;
however, none of these funds materialised, due in the cases of Argentina and Brazil to the
"tequila effect"
57. MExico's FiNANciAL. Ctsis, supra note 16, at 110-14
58. US.-Mexico Framework Agreement for Mexican Economic Stabilization, Feb. 21, 1995, Art. I
[hereinafter Framework Agreement] (on file with the author).
59. See Mexico's FiNANCIAL Gusis, supra note 17, at 117-18
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Under the package, the U.S. pledged up to $20 billion in loans and securities guar-
antees from the ESF.60 As part of the amount, the Fed agreed to provide up to $6 billion in
short-term swaps from its pre-existing swap line, and the Treasury agreed to provide back-
ing for the Fed swaps as part of the ESF program by assuring repayment of any short-term
drawings that were counted against the $20 billion limit.6'
Specifically, U.S. assistance was offered through three mechanisms: 62 (i) short-
term currency swaps for up to 90 days, with renewals for a maximum term of 1 year for
Treasury swaps and renewals up to three times for Fed swaps; (ii) medium-term currency
swaps for up to 5 years; and (iii) securities guarantees under which ESF funds could be used
to back up securities issued by the Mexican government for up to 10 years. Under this
60. Framework Agreement, supra note 57, Art III. See MEXIcO's FINANCIAL CRIsis, supra note 17, at
118-23 & Appendix I, 148-152 (discussing the use of the ESF and Federal Reserve resources).
Congress established the ESF in 1934 pursuant to section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934
"for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange value of the dollar:' 31 U.S.C. § 5302. Since its pas-
sage, the statute has been amended to broaden its purpose from the stabilisation of the dollar to
include the promotion of orderly exchange arrangements and a stable system of exchange rates.
See H.R. No. 94-1284, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 13-14 (1976). The legality of the use of the ESF for
this purpose has been questioned. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Note: Adventures in the Zone of
Twilight: Separation of Powers and National Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout 105 YALE
L. J. 1311 (1996); James D. Humphrey II, Student Note: Foreign Affairs Powers and "The First
Crisis of the 21st Century": Congressional vs. Executive Authority and the Stabilization Plan for
Mexico, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L 181 (1995). The Treasury and the Department of Justice, however,
provided legal opinions stating that the requisite legal authority was in fact present. See letter
from Edward S. Knight, General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, to Robert E. Rubin,
Secretary of the Treasury, Feb. 21, 1995; and Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant
Attorney General of the U.S. Department of justice, to Edward S. Knight, General Counsel of the
Department of the Treasury, Mar. 2, 1995 (both on file with the author). Not surprisingly, the
GAO agreed. MExIco's FINANCIAL Cisis, supra note 17, at 114-17.
61. Framework Agreement, supra note 58, Art. III. See MFXIco's FINANCIAL Cmsis, supra note 17, at
118-123.
62. To put the US. assistance package into place, the U.S. and Mexico entered into four financial
agreements: (i) the Framework Agreement, supra note 58; (ii) the Oil Proceeds Facility
Agreement, Framework Agreement, supra note 58, Annex A [hereinafter Oil Agreement]; (iii)
the Medium-Term Exchange Stabilization Agreement, Feb. 21, 1996; and (iv) the Guarantee
Agreement Dated as of February 21, 1995 among The United States Department of the
Treasury, and The Government of the United Mexican States, Feb. 21, 1995 [hereinafter
Guarantee Agreement] (all on file with the author). For an analysis of the package, see
Patricia A. Wertman, Peso Crisis: The Mexican Support Package: A Survey and Analysis, 5 NO. 8
MEx. TRADE & L. RE. 19 (Aug. 1995) [Part I] (analyzing the structure of the rescue package and
public policy issues related to U.S. involvement); idem., Peso Crisis: The Mexican Support
Package: A Survey and Analysis, 5 NO. 9 MEx. TRAD & L. REp. 9 (Sept. 1995) [Part II] (analyz-
ing protections for U.S. taxpayers and Mexico's use of the package). Note that in fact Mexico
has made use of this package and that in fact the U.S. has made a profit on its commitments.
See MExico's FINANCIAL CRisis, supra note 17, at 136-39.
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package, Mexico effectively pays the same interest rates that other countries pay for short-
term currency swaps63 and other longer-term lending.64 Further, as part of the package,
Mexico agreed to abide by certain economic criteria,65 and the U.S. and Mexico entered
into an oil agreement to ensure that in the event of a default by Mexico, the U.S. would be
repaid through earnings from Mexico's oil exports.66
The second largest component of the assistance package for Mexico came from
the IME The IMF pledged up to $17.8 billion 67 in financial assistance in the form of a
standby arrangement for Mexico to be disbursed over a period of 18 months. Mexico pays
standard rates and fees for this assistance package, 68 drawings upon which have a maturity
of up to five years. This arrangement, conditioned upon Mexico's adherence to strict eco-
nomic performance criteria, was the largest financing package ever approved by IMF for a
member country, both in terms of the amount and the overall percentage of a member's
credit quota.69
2. Domestic Responses.
As part of the terms and conditions of the international rescue package, the gov-
ernment of Mexico released a new economic plan on March 9, 1995, to address the required
63. See MEXIco's FINANCIAL CRusiS, supra note 17, at 123-27. For example, as of the end of October
1995, this rate was 5.25%.
64. Id. For example, Mexico was charged 9.2% in July 1995 for its longer-term borrowings.
65. Framework Agreement, supra note 58, Arts V, VI. See also Framework Agreement, Annex B,
Letter to Michel Camdessus, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund from Guillermo
Ortiz Martinez, Secretary of Finance and Public Credit of Mexico & Miguel Mancera Aguayo,
Governor, Bank of Mexico, and Mexico-Memorandum of Economic Policies; Annex C,
Economic Policy Memorandum; and Annex D, Public Availability of Government and Bank of
Mexico Statistical Information.
66. Oil Agreement, supra note 62 Under this mechanism, all of Mexico's foreign oil revenues flow
through an acount at the Federal Reseve Bank of New York. While these revenues probably
would not be sufficient on a daily basis to cover a major default, their existence makes the likeli-
hood of eventual repayment far more likely. See Mexaco's FINANcIAL CIUs1s, supra note 17, at
123-127.
67. IMF, Camdessus to Recommend that IMF Commit an Additional $10 billion for Mexico, Raising
its Total Commitment to $178 billion, IMF NEws BRIEr no. 95/5, Jan. 31, 1995. IMF actually
approved assistance for Mexico for up to special drawing rights (SDR) 12.07bn. The SDR is the
international reserve asset created and used by the IMF to denominate all its accounts. It is
comprised of a basket of five currencies, of which the U.S. dollar is the most significant. Id.
68. Id. Interest rates for IMF drawings has been approximately 5% per year, and fees are charged at
25% per year commitment fee for funds remaining available, as well as a .50% usage fee on each
drawing. Mexico's FINANCIAL CRisis, supra note 17, at 128-31.
69. See Id. at 128-131. The arrangement was 688.4% over 18 months, while the usual cumulative
limit is 300%.
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economic criteria provided in the agreements with the U.S. and the IME 70 Overall, the
goals of the plan are to restore financial stability, strengthen public finances and the banking
sector, regain confidence, and reinforce the groundwork for long-term sustainable growth.
In general terms, the plan addresses monetary policy, exchange rate policy, fiscal policy,
banking policy,7 1 incomes and social policy, and improved transparency72 - all consistent
with IMF conditionality.73
Although the government of Mexico has taken steps to improve the Mexican
banking system, the banking sector still remains burdened by a non-performing loan level
estimated by the World Bank to be about 27 percent of total loans as of 30 September
1995.74 The government of Mexico has taken several measures designed to help the bank-
ing sector deal with the problems associated with Mexico's financial difficulties several of
these were initiated unilaterally by Mexico, while others were undertaken with the direct
support of the international financial community.75
Further, in an effort to provide a more efficient market, Mexico is taking steps to
introduce new financial instruments that would modernise Mexican financial markets to
serve the needs of investors. Importantly, the Bolsa and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
are developing distinct peso and interest futures contracts to create a North American stan-
dard for futures trading for pesos and Mexican Treasury interest rates.76 The level of
volatility in the peso exchange rate is expected to decline with the addition of the peso
futures contract, so that international investors can hedge against exchange-rate risk, and
Mexico may gradually introduce other derivative financial instruments, such as warrants on
individual Mexican securities and options on individual Mexican stocks.77
70. See MEXIco's FINANCIAL CRIsis, supra note 17, at 128-31, 133-36; Patricia A Wertman, Economic
Recovery: Mexico's 1995 Economic Program and the IMF, 5 NO. 6 MFx. TRADE & L. Rap. 4 (June
1, 1995); Patracia Wertman, Peso Crisis: Mexico's 1995 Economic Program and the IM, 5 NO. 3
Mex Trade & L. Rep. 7 (Mar. 1, 1995). Mexico actually proposed an initial economic plan in
January 1995; however, without the international rescue package in place, it was largely
ignored.
71. The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and other sources agreed to
provide up to $3 billion to strengthen Mexican banks.
72. The plan included a promise by Mexico that information on foreign currency reserves and
domestic credit conditions should be announced on a weekly basis Such disclosure was also
mandated by the Framework Agreement, supra note 58, Annex D, supra note 65. Presumably,
this will be consistent with new IMF disclosure policies. See infra, Section In.
73. Framework Agreement, supra note 58, Annex B, supra note 65. See MExIco's FINANCAL CRisis,
supra note 17, at 133-136.
74. Id at 143-146.
75. See id
76. Id. at 133-136. Peso futures contracts have been trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
since April 1995.
77. For a full discussion of dervivatives, their uses, and implications, see GAO, FINANCIAL
DERIvATIvEs: Ac'ioNs NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCL SYSTEM (GAO/GGD-94-133, May 18,
1995)
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D. EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS.
In order to gauge the success of the rescue package, one must look to whether
international investor confidence has increased and to whether Mexico has been able to
reenter international capital markets - both of which seem to be occurring. 78 Beyond
these factors, the Bolsa has picked up, rising to past its 8 September 1994 level on 8
December 1995, although it has fluctuated considerably.79 Overall, then, while serious
problems still face Mexico, the international and domestic efforts seem to have been
arguably effective.
III. Capital Surges and Domestic Market Regulation.
As will be demonstrated by the following discussion, the weakness of the Mexican
banking system was both an important cause of the Crisis and an important consequence
thereof as well. For this reason, a short overview of Mexican finandal market regulation
and its specific efforts both to reform it and to recover from the impact of the Crisis are
instructive.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF THE MEXICAN FINANCIAL
SYSTEM.
Following the nationalisation of the banking system in 1982 and the efforts of
Mexico to reform its economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mexico has substantially
reformed its domestic financial system. In 1990, constitutional amendments and new
banking legislation 8O set the stage for the return of the commercial banking system to pri-
vate hands,81 and between June 1991 and July 1992, all of the commercial banks were priva-
tized, most of which became subsidiaries of newly established financial holding
companies.82 At the same time as the new privatized banking regime was set in place,
deposit lending rates, reserve requirements, requirements to lend to specific sectors, and
78. See MExico's FINANCIAL CRusis, supra note 17, at 139-143, esp tbl. 5.1.
79. Id. at 139-143.
80. The Credit Institutions Law (Ley de Instituciones de Cre'dito) was introduced in July 1990 and
has been amended on a number of occasions It replaced an earlier law that was drafted to gov-
ern the activities of the banks nationalised in 1982. Together with the Financial Groups Law
(Ley para Regular las Agrupaciones Financieras), it established the basis for the conglomerate
banking model in effect in Mexico today. The Credit Institutions Law was intended to provide
an appropriate legal framework for the capital structure, activities and supervision of the repri-
vatised banking system as well as for the activities of state-owned development banks. Roy A.
Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 Devaluation-A
Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 NW. J. INT'L L & Bus. 24,25 (1995).
81. Mexico's commercial banks, with the exceptions of Citibank and Banco Obrero, were nation-
alised in 1982 in the wake of the Debt Crisis Prior to the initiation of the privatisation pro-




other limitations on bank lending activities were significantly deregulated. 83
In Mexico, responsibility for financial regulation and supervision is shared among
the Banco de Mexico (Mexico's central bank),84 the Ministry of Finance, and the National
Banking and Securities Commission (Comisi6n National Bacaria y de Valores or CNBV). 85
Although steps to improve banking supervision were taken at the time of the privatization
of the commercial banks, efforts to fully equip the CNBV to supervise the new system
began only in 1994.86 As such, one of the principal goals of the new system was to facilitate
the effective supervision of financial groups on a consolidated basis by placing the supervi-
sors of Mexico's brokerage houses under the same roof as the supervisors of their banking
affiliates. While a basic framework for implementing new policies and procedures for bank
inspections had been put in place by CNBV, there was not sufficient time before the onset of
the Peso Crisis to prepare an adequate number of trained and experienced inspectors to be
fully effective. 87
Beyond basic supervision, the Credit Institutions Law provided for the establish-
ment of the Bank Fund for Savings Support (Fondo Bancaria para Proteccio'n de Ahorro, or
FOBAPROA) 88 and defined the legal basis for its provisions of "preventive support" to trou-
bled banks.8 9 FOBAPROKs role goes beyond simple deposit insurance, and under the
Credit Institutions Law, the fund is required to give notice each December of the types of
bank assets it will cover the following year, and the flexibility accorded FOBAPROA under
the Credit Institutions Law has permitted it to function as the instrument for a number of
the Mexican government's responses to the effects of the Peso Crisis on the banking sector.
Not surprisingly, once privatized, banks competed fiercely to gain market share in
the provision of loans, both by increasing the volumes of their existing lines of business and
83. "In July 1993, amendments to the Credit Institutions Law and Financial Groups Law were
approved which weakened the restrictions on the types of services which could be provided by
banks and other financial entities New regulations were also issued governing the treatment of
newly-introduced financial instruments, securities activities of banks, and the establishment of
independent credit bureaux:' Id at 28.
84. Id In June 1993, the Mexican Constitution was amended and legislation went into effect granti-
ng the Banco de Mexico greater autonomy and more clearly defining its functions as those relat-
ing to conduct of monetary policy and supervision of the payments system and foreign
exchange markets. Id.
85. Id The Credit Institutions Law established the National Banking Commission (created under
earlier legislation) as the chief supervisory authority for both private commercial banks and
state-owned development banks Id.
86. Id The Banking and Securities Commission Law (Ley de la Comisio'n Nacional Bancaria y de
Valores) went into effect on 1 May 1995, and provided for the merger of the National Banking
Commission with the National Securities Commission, the principal regulator of the securities
industry. Id.
87. Id at 29-30.
88. FOBAPROA's operations are funded through annual and special contributions from commer-
cial banks and from credit extended to FOBAPROA by the Banco deMexico Id at 30.
89. FOBAPROA is organised as a trust administered by the central bank; however, Article 122 of
the Credit Institutions Law establishes that FOBAPRO's policies will be established by a tech-
nical committee with members appointed by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, CNBV,
and the Central Bank A majority of the members of the technical committee are appointed by
the Ministry of Finance. Id at 30.
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by entering the markets for relatively new financial services, such as home mortgages and
credit cards.90 Unable to attract conventional deposits fast enough to support new
lending,91 many banks increased their reliance on interbank funding, the bulk of which
consisted of lines of credit from foreign banks.92 A rapid expansion of lending to private
enterprises usually takes place at the cost of a drop-off in portfolio quality, and the develop-
ment of the Mexican banking system was not an exception. 93 Notwithstanding the shortfall
in banks provisions, 94 the banks' capital adequacy ratios improved during the period 1991-
94, as the financial authorities instituted a phased increase in the minimum required ratio
of net capital to risk-weighted assets, from 6 percent at the end of 1991 to 7 percent by the
end of 1992, and then to 8 percent by the end of 1993.95
B. IMPACT OF CAPirAL Fows ON THE Maxmac FINANCIAL SYSTEM.
According to Bank of Mexico officials, the fragile state of Mexican commercial
banks during 1994 presented a serious challenge to financial authorities' ability to use mon-
etary policy to decrease the current account deficit that eventually necessitated the devalua-
tion and the international rescue package.96 Beyond its impact on attempts to prevent the
90. Between 1991 and 1994, aggregate assets of the commercial banks increased by 1113 % in nom-
inal terms (64.6% in real terms), equivalent to a real annual growth of 18.1%. In 1994, assets of
the commercial banking system averaged new pesos (N$) 735 billion, equivalent to 58.8% of
GDP, compared to 42.5% in 1991. Id. at 25-26.
91. Although deposit mobilisation improved significantly after privatisation, with the ratio of aver-
age deposits to GDP increasing from 214% in 1991 to 31.3% in 1994, the rate of growth of loan
portfolios outstripped that of deposits. The ratio of loans to deposits increased steadily from
94.1% at the end of 1991 to 113.8% in 1993, and to 124.0% in 1994. Id. at 26.
92. Interbank credit lines increased from the equivalent of N$34 billion at the end of 1991 (of
which N$23 billion were denominated in foreign currency) to N$124 billion at the end of 1994
(of which the equivalent of N$92 billion ($173 billion) were denominated in foreign currency).
Id. at 26.
93. Aggregate past due loans of commercial banks (excluding Banco Union and Banco Cremi, both
of which were already subject to intervention at this time) accounted for 409% of gross loans at
the end of 1991, increased to 7.25% by the end of 1993. During the first half of 1994, the ratio
increased to 8.30%, before decreasing to 7.33% by year end, largely due to a 27% increase in
gross loans during the second half of 1994. Id. at 26-27. Note that in analysing the Mexican
banking system, it is important to keep in mind that Mexican banks prepare their financial
statements under Mexican Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("Mexican GAAP") and
that these differ in a number of important respects from US. GAAP, including the definition
and treatment of non-performing loans, of provisions, and of the accrual of interest on loans.
Id. at n. 4.
94. Aggregate loan-loss provisions more than doubled from nearly N$50 bn at the end of 1991 to
more than N$13.0 billion by the end of 1993; however, the ratio of provisions to past due loans
actually decreased from 50.8% to 42.7% during the two-year interval, before rebounding some-
what to 47.9% by the end of 1994. Id. at 27.
95. The average ration actually increased from 773.% at the end of 1991 to 9.94% in 1993, to
10.27% at the end of September 1994, before decreasing to 9.60% by the end of 1994. Id. at 27-
28, citing CNBV data.
96. INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKTS, supra note 3, at 8-9; MEXICO'S FINANCIAL CPusIs, supra note 17,
at 40-49.
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crisis, the Mexican financial system was severely impacted by the crisis. According to the
IMF, overall net capital outflows totalled more than $11.5 billion in the first quarter of
1995.97 As an example, the Bolsa index declined sharply in the wake of the devaluation,
falling 39 percent in nominal peso terms from the end of 1994 to February 27, 1995.98
After the devaluation, Mexican banks came under pressure in a number of ways.99
First, many banks faced an immediate dollar liquidity problem in January because pesos
continued to be converted to dollars, and foreign lenders were reluctant to roll over their dol-
lar claims on Mexican banks in significant volume. 10 Second, the banks' capitalization lev-
els were negatively impacted by their dollar-based obligations as the peso continued to
decline against the dollar.101 Third, banks' asset quality suffered as the percentage of non-
performing loans continued to rise102 and portfolio values continued to fall103 in the face of
dramatically rising Mexican interest rates. The overall result of these effects was a significant
97. Msxico's FINANcIAL CPisis, supra note 2, at 65.
98. Id. at 64 & 65, Chart 1.11. During this period, the peso declined 32 percent against the dollar,
reaching a low of 7.45 to the dollar - 53 percent below its devaluation level. Id. at 63.
99. See MEXIco's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 17, at 143-146.
100. At the end of 1994, aggregate deposits with the commercial banks (excluding Union and Cremi)
totalled N$4139 billion, of which 18.3% was denominated in foreign currency and 73.6% con-
sisted of time deposits. As a result of the Peso Crisis, the banks came under significant liquidity
pressure as they found it extremely difficult to roll over maturing CDs, and during the first
three months of 1995, aggregate foreign currency-denominated deposits with the commercial
banks (including Union and Crerni) decreased by 23%, or by more than $3.5 billion, to stand at
the end of March 1995 at $11.8 billion, equivalent to 15.8% of total deposits. Although the liq-
uidity assistance provided by FOBAPROA to the commercial banks, amounting to $3.3 billion
during the first quarter of 1995, significantly improved the banks' liquidity position, the liquidi-
ty crunch still had significant adverse effects on the banks' average cost of funds, and hence, on
their profitability during the first half of 1995. Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 80, at 32.
101. Although under prevailing regulatory guidelines, banks are required to limit their foreign curren-
cy liabilities to no more than 20% of total liabilities, and their open short or long foreign currency
positions to no more than 15% of net capital, for the system as a whole, fourth quarter foreign
exchange losses totalled about N$46 billion, equivalent to more than 106 of equity. Id at 31.
102. As previously described, the high rate of growth of Mexico's banking system in the period after
privatisation was accompanied by an increase in the level of non-performing loans As a result
of loan-loss provisions due to this increase, combined with the foreign exchange losses, the
impairment in the values of securities portfolios, and the unrealised losses from the banks' sub-
sidiaries, the banking system (excluding Union and Cremi) recorded an aggregate loss before tax
of N$3.5 billion during the fourth quarter of 1994, equivalent to 43% of profits (before tax)
during the first three quarters of the year, and to 7.9% of the equity at year end. Id. at 33.
These effects were further accentuated by the increase of interest rates on consumer debt, mort-
gages and commercial credit to above 80% during the months immediately following the deval-
uation, before falling to 30-40% by late spring. Id.
103. The banks' aggregate investment portfolio increased by about 84% in 1994 to reach a level of
N$859 billion at the end of the year. The bulk of these investments consisted of fixed income
securities (N$55.8 billion), whose value was impaired by the sharp hike in interest rates. In the
aftermath of the devaluation, the CNBV issued in January 1995 a new regulation requiring
banks to value their securities at market prices and to disclose their unrealised gains or losses on
their financial assets and liabilities in their off-balance sheet accounts as of the end of 1994.
Including Banamex (Mexico's largest bank and the only bank to show realised losses on its
securities portfolio), the losses (both realised and unrealised) amounted to N$660 million,
equivalent to 1.5% of the system's equity at year end. Id at 31-32.
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drop in bank capitalization, with the average ratio of net capital to risk-weighted assets of the
nineteen major Mexican commercial banks decreasing from 9.40 percent to 7.75 percent.' 04
The immediate effects of the December 1994 peso devaluation and the period of
high interest rates and economic recession that followed had important repercussions for
the Mexican banking and financial systems.105 The impact of Mexico's current recession on
the financial conditions of Mexico's banking system has been serious, especially since
Mexico's newly privatized banks still have not resolved all the problems brought with them
from the time of nationalisation. Moreover, interest rates have continued to increase, con-
tributing to an already high level of non-performing loans, with delinquent loans as report-
ed by Mexico rising to approximately 17 percent of all bank loans by the end of September
1995. As a result, many of the largest Mexican banks are looking for domestic and foreign
investors to provide capital infusions.
C. DOMESTIC REGULATORY MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE IMPACr OF THE
CRISIS
Since the onset of the crisis, the Mexican government has undertaken a number of
important actions designed to assure adequate capitalization of financial institutions and
continued public confidence in the banking system.' 0 6 The goal throughout has been to
avoid a banking crisis that would exacerbate the contraction in the real economy and to set
the stage for a recovery of the financial system based on sound institutions and efficient
financial markets. Similar to the probable situation in future liquidity crises in most devel-
oping countries, the rapid devaluation of the peso and its after effects hit a relatively new
banking system which was still undergoing a process of maturation, with both the banks
and the supervisory authorities working to improve their institutional capacity in order to
be effective in their new environment.
The steps taken have included amendments to the legal framework for foreign
ownership of banks, reinforcement of supervision, programs for recapitalising troubled
banks, the introduction of inflation-indexed lending and the provision of indexed funding
to banks, a debtor relief program, and direct intervention to those banks that proved unable
to weather the crisis and its after effects. 107 Further, Mexican officials are receiving techni-
cal assistance from several international organizations, including the World Bank, to help
strengthen their supervisory capability; and have received a $1.7-billion loan to recapitalize
the deposit insurance fund of FOBAPROA, thereby allowing it to purchase assets and
resolve failing institutions more effectively.108
The government responded to the banks' immediate needs for liquidity following
104. In fact, at the end of February 1995, nine of the nineteen banks had ratios below 8% as com-
pared to only 3 at the end of 1994 Id. at 34, citing CNBV data. The figures exclude Cremi,
Union, Banpais, and Oriente all of which were then intervened or controlled by FOBAPROA.
105. See INT'L CAPITAL MARKErS, supra note 3, at 8-9.
106. Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 80, at 24.
107. Id. See INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 143-46.
108. See id.
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the devaluation with the establishment of a special FOBAPROA window to provide dollar
liquidity, 109 while the Banco de Mexico provided short-term peso credit in its function as
lender of last resort. 110 In an effort to attract additional capital to the Mexican banking sys-
tem, Mexico substantially reduced restrictions on foreign investment, 1 1 and Mexico's
financial sector legislation was amended in February 1995 to permit foreign individuals and
companies as a group to hold up to 49 percent of the voting shares of a Mexican-controlled
financial holding company, commercial bank, or brokerage house.112 Further, in order to
encourage take-overs or mergers between better capitalized foreign financial institutions
and existing Mexican banks, the amendments permitted foreign financial institutions to
purchase a controlling interest in any Mexican commercial bank with a market share of less
than six percent 
13
109. See INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 17, at 143-146. The banks problems in this regard mir-
rored those of the government. Under the special window, FOBAPROA provided short-term
dollar loans (initially 28 days, but later shortened), at interest rates up to 25% (in order to dis-
courage use of the window except in ctremis), and requiring as security government securities,
debt securities of Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. (the state development bank), or equity securities
of the recipient bank. On 31 March 1995, total outstanding balances drawn by ten of the com-
mercial banks were about $3.3 billion, but as the immediate crisis passed, banks were successful
in finding cheaper sources of funding, and by August 1995, balances owed to FOBAPROA had
been repaid. Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 80, at 35.
110. See INT'L CAPITAL MARKErS, supra note 3, at 143-146 These funds were provided through spe-
cial credit auctions, initially on an unsecured basis, but after 20 March 1995, requiring banks to
post government securities, Nacional Financiera securities, or loans provided to prime borrow-
ers in an effort to prevent moral hazard. Outstanding balances stood at the equivalent of $3.0
billion by 31 March 1995; however, as the immediate crisis passed, banks were able to return to
the private money markets. Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 80, at 35.
111. See INT'L CAPITAL MARKETs, supra note 17, at 143-46. Historically, Mexican financial sector leg-
islation has included sharp limits on foreign participation in financial institutions operating in
Mexico. Even though these restrictions were relaxed somewhat in anticipation of the entry into
force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); however, even under the 1993
amendments to the Credit Institutions Law, foreign-controlled commercial banks were subject-
ed to individual and aggregate market-share limitations, such that no single foreign-controlled
bank could represent more than 1.5% of the capital of the Mexican banking system, and all for-
eign banks taken together could not represent more than 8% of the market. Karaoglan &
Lubrano, supra note 80, at 36.
112. The previous ceiling for Mexican-controlled commercial banks had been 30%. Id. at 36.
113. For a detailed description of the February 1995 amendments, see Lubrano, Mexico Amends
Financial Sector Legislation to Attract Greater Investment and Reinforce Supervision, 2 NORTH
AMER CoWp. LAw. 90-93 (1995).
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In addition, the Mexican government of has taken several measures to bolster the
capitalization of the Mexican banking system. 114 In an effort to address asset quality prob-
lems, Mexico undertook a series of measures throughout 1995 to address the increase in
non-performing loans resulting from the peso's devaluation and the subsequent financial
turmoil.115 Recognizing the need to deal with the deterioration of asset quality in the
banking system at the onset of the financial crisis, Mexican regulators implemented a more
stringent system for maintaining adequate loan loss reserves in early 1995.116 Mexico has
also created a new program to help banks restructure portions of their loan portfolios to
114. In February 1995, it launched the Temporary Capitalisation Programme (Programma de
Capitalizacion Temporal or PROCAPTE) PROCAPTE is a voluntary programme designed to
assist banks that have capitalisation levels that fall below the internationally accepted standard
of 8 percent of risk-weighted assets, and is intended to be used by viable banks that are facing
short-term capital needs, thus allowing them to continue operating, rather than by problem
banks that may require intervention. Under PROCAPTE, whenever a participating bank's capi-
talisation falls below 8.5%, FOBAPROA may subscribe additional subordinated debentures.
Banks in the PROCAPTE programme issue subordinated convertible debentures purchased by
FOBAPROA, in an amount sufficient to raise their capitalisation level to 9 percent, and the
banks deposit the proceeds in an account at the Banco de Mexico which pays interest at the
same rate as the debentures. The debt must be repaid in 5 years or FOBAPROA will convert the
debt to equity and sell the equity in the private market or simply hold the shares. This has been
criticised as potentially resulting in a sort of"creeping" nationalisation. In March 1995, 6 banks
entered into the PROCAPTE program and issued approximately $1 billion in subordinated
debt, while a seventh, Probursa, had been given additional time to meet minimum requirements
in anticipation of its purchase by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV), a Spanish bank and important
shareholder. See GAO, at 143-46. See also, Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 79, at 38-39.
115. See Mi co's FINANcIAL CIusis, supra note 17, at 143-146. See also, Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra
note 80, at 39-40.
116. Under the legislation, banks are required to maintain reserves for non- performing loans of at
least 60 percent, reserves equal to 4 percent of the total loan portfolio, or provisions as required
from quarterly loan classifications under earlier rules, whichever is highest Karaoglan &
Lubrano, supra note 80, at 38. Under the previous system, Mexican banks had discretion in clas-
sifying their loan portfolios in five categories. Under that system, banks created loan loss
reserves based on requirements for each level of classification. See Id., at 27, n.5. Under this sys-
tem, in December 1994, provisioning for past due loans across all categories averaged 47.9%. Id.
Fall 1996 49
increase the likelihood that loans will continue to perform in the face of high inflation and
interest rates. 117
Notwithstanding the efforts of the Mexican government to improve bank liquidi-
ty, bolster the capitalisation of the Mexican banking system, and institute the loan restruc-
turing programme for banks, the state of the Mexican banking system still remains a con-
cern. 118 Further, Mexico still faces a number of challenges before the crisis can be consid-
ered resolved, including high interest rates, continued volatility in the peso, and weak eco-
nomic growth. 119
IV. The International Response to the Threat of Future Capital Surges.
The profile of international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank
makes them the usual starting point in any discussion of problems in the international
financial system. The increasing role of these institutions in development, the IMF's part in
the Debt Crisis of the 1980s, and the 50th year anniversary of the Bretton Woods system
have made these institutions the focus of debate regarding sovereign liquidity and debt
problems. In this regard, the IMF's desire to find a new leadership role in the period after
the deterioration of the Bretton Woods system may be seen by its unusual efforts during the
Peso Crisis, 120 given that the IMF's contribution far exceeded the amount that would nor-
117. On I April 1995, the Mexican Congress approved legislation permitting the use of an inflation-
indexed unit of account for financial transactions (Unidad de Inversio'n or UDI). D.O., Apr. 1,
1995, at 2. The programme, the loan restructuring programme, essentially allows loan repay-
ments to be stretched out and weighted more heavily toward the end of the loan by denominat-
ing loans in a UDI instrument that is linked to the consumer price index The borrowers repay
a real rate of interest, while the real value of the principal is preserved and amortised over an
extended maturity. Unfortunately, the programme has taken off slowly since its implementa-
tion in April 1995 due to the need to train both bank personnel and borrowers on its operation
and benefits. In addition to the UDI programme, on 23 August 1995, the government institut-
ed a programme to provide direct interest subsidies to certain borrowers from commercial
banks. The Agreement of Immediate Support of Bank Debtors (Acuerdo de Apoyo Inmediato a
Deudores de la Banca or ADE) accelerates the restructuring of non-performing as well as per-
forming loans to viable borrowers by bridging, for a one-year period, the gap between what
borrowers were willing to pay and what lenders were willing to accept, and was intended to pre-
empt more extreme measures being promoted by certain borrower pressure groups and to
bring loans to viable borrowers back into performing status. Overall, the programme seems to
be a success, with most credit card loans and mortgages, as well as a significant portion of busi-
ness and consumer loans being restructured. See MExico's FINANCIAL CRIsIS, supra note 17, at
143-46; see also, Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 80, at 40-43.
118. MEXICO'S FINANCIAL Cpisis, supra note 17, at 146.
119. Economic growth for 1995, forecast at the start of the year by the Mexican government to show
a decline of 2 percent, has been much worse. Ii
120. Zanny Minton-Beddoes, who writes for The Economist, has suggested that IMF overreached its
capacity, not because of the US. influence on IMF policies, but rather because of its desire for
new relevance in a world economy now characterised by instability and private power. See
Zanny Minton-Beddoes, Why IMF Needs Reform, FOREIGN AFF., May 1995, at 123. See also,
Robert Chote, Weaknesses in IMF Shown by Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995.
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mally be available to a country such as Mexico under IMF rules.121
In circumstances such as the Peso Crisis, in which financial markets essentially
cease to function in terms of access, markets cannot be relied on to provide necessary liq-
uidity,12 2 and for this reason, an international response is probably necessary for the stabil-
ity of the international and domestic financial systems. During the Peso Crisis, Mexico
was faced with a temporary liquidity crisis due to a large number of intertwined factors,
some caused by problems within or exacerbated by Mexico, but other not, e.g. increases in
U.S. interest rates. As a result of the Crisis and the perceived need to protect the interna-
tional financial system, the U.S. organized an international response to the crisis. While
these efforts may have been sui generis do to the importance of Mexico to the U.S. and due
to Mexico's prominent position among LDCs, some efforts have since been made to
address future liquidity crises and attempt to prevent them from causing long-term nega-
tive consequences.
A country can respond to a current account deficit in a number of ways, indud-
ing- (i) attracting more foreign capital; (ii) allowing its currency to depreciate, thus making
imports more expensive and exports cheaper; (iii) tightening monetary and/or fiscal policy
to reduce the demand for all goods, including imports; and (iv) using foreign exchange
reserves to cover the deficit. 123 If a country is unable to correct its current account prob-
lems, a liquidity crisis will result in which the country has insufficient reserves to make nec-
essary external payments.
Nations with liquidity problems require new money in order to bridge the prob-
lem period and avoid the transition from a temporary liquidity crisis to a more serious debt
crisis. There are three obvious sources of new money- first, official sources; second, new
debt issues; and third, commercial banks.124 During the Peso Crisis, Mexico tapped official
sources, namely the U.S. and IMF; however, using government money as the main resource
for liquidity is both unsustainable and expensive. New debt issues are unlikely in the pre-
sent climate, and in fact Mexico was not able to access such sources until six months after
the onset of the Crisis, and only then because it already had the official backing of the U.S.
and IME A six month delay, however, turns a liquidity crisis into a debt crisis, and makes
additional issues even more unlikely than previously. Finally, commercial banks will only
lend if there is some indication that they will in fact be repaid by what is, by the very nature
of the crisis situation, a risky debtor.125 For this reason, some commentators argue that if
121. George Graham, $50 billion Mexico Aid Plan "Averted a Global Crisis': 'Exceptional' Support Was
Required, Says IMF Chief, FIN TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1995, at 16. IMF's contribution to support Mexico
has been estimated at almost one-fifth of IMF's liquid resources and seven times Mexico's
quota. Perspective on a Panic, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1995, at 8.
122. According to Bank of Mexico data, for three successive weekly auctions between 27 December
1994 and 10 January 1995, the Mexican government was simply unable to sell tesobonos
MEXco's FINANCIAL. Cisis, supra note 17, at 137.
123. Seegeneraly ITERNAmoNAL CAPrrAL MARss, supra note 3, at 95-108.
124. See Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 NW J. INT'L L. & Bus. 57
(1995), at 104-105. [hereinafter Debt Work-out System].
125. Id. at 105. If the new money takes priority over the old money, however, commercial banks
might in fact be induced to lend The problem, then, is getting creditors to agree to subordinate
their outstanding debt to the new money necessary to provide the liquidity to make payments
flow again on the outstanding debt. Id.
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the underlying problems of debt rescheduling were solved, that the necessary requirements
for the provision of new money would fall into place, thereby using the solution to potential
debt crises to avert future liquidity crises. 126 The suggestion is that rescheduling agree-
ments would be promoted because lenders would be "waiting in the wings to lend
" 127
At least three basic changes in the financial environment have some bearing on the
character of potential future sovereign liquidity crises. 128 First, the broader and stronger
linkages among domestic and international financial market mean that crises can erupt
much more quickly in today's markets and can be far larger in scope than in the past.
Second, flows of capital to emerging market economies in the form of purchases of securi-
ties have increased greatly in size over the years and have substituted for other types of pri-
vate capital. Third, when a crisis occurs new finance is unlikely to be forthcoming from
those who took the original lending. These changes mean that financing available from
official sources is less likely to be sufficient to enable a sovereign debtor experiencing a crisis
to meet fully its external financing obligations. 129 Moreover, provision of official funds to
limit private losses raises serious moral hazard risks and could in fact interfere with market
discipline. 130
Given this background, the next sections provide a brief overview of international
responses to the threat of future liquidity crises.
A. THE IMF RESPONSE: LIQUIDITY AND DiscLosuRE.
Principally as a reaction to the sudden and overwhelming nature of the Peso
Crisis, world leaders agreed to double the emergency funds of the IMF.131 The "General
Agreement to Borrow," whereby IMF may draw upon the fund of the Group of Ten (G-10)
governments and Saudi Arabia, is being increased to $52 billion. 132 This greatly increases
the official lending power of the IMF to deal with the sort of liquidity crises experienced by
Mexico, and it enhances the IMF's capacity as a lender of last resort 1 33 Such an institution,
however, poses the classic risk of "moral hazard" as investors may begin to rely on the inter-
126. This solution seems to be supported by the G-10 See infta, Section IIl.B. If an agreement to
this effect could not be reached, say within 6 months, Macmillan suggests that perhaps legisla-
tion of creditor countries could be amended to provide that following a debt rescheduling
agreement that new debt would take priority over old. Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at
106.
127. Debt Work-out System,supra note 124, at 106.
128. WORKING PARTY, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDrY CRIsEs, Executive Summary, para 3
(Group of Ten, Apr. 22, 1996), Executive Summary, reprinted in part in WORLD SEcs. REG. L.
REp. (BNA), Apr. 28,1996, at 32-34 hereinafter, WORKING PARTY.
129. Id.
130. Id
131. Robert Choate, et aL IMF Set to Get More Crisis Cash, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995.
132. Id.
133. The theory of the lender of last resort was first set out by Walter Bagehot He explained that if
there were an institution ready to guarantee liquidity when the lending community doubted
the debtor's liquidity, then commercial lenders would have confidence that new loans would be
repaid See Walter Bagehot, LOMBARD SREET 1902.
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national community rather than monitoring country risks themselves. 134 Further, moral
hazard poses high potential costs to the public sector because the capital of IMF is supplied
by member governments.
As a second response to the Peso Crisis, the IMF has approved the Special Data
Dissemination Standard (SDDS) for the provision of economic and financial statistics to
the public by member countries, especially those countries that participate in the interna-
tional capital markets or aspire to do so, and including both industrial and emerging
economies. 135
In the aftermath of the Peso Crisis, the IMF's Interim Committee emphasised at its
26 April 1995 meeting that timely publication by members of comprehensive economic and
financial data would give greater transparency to members' economic policies and thereby
increase investor confidence and decrease the chances of unexpected surprises that might
result in the massive capital outflows that characterized the aftermath of the Peso Crisis. The
purpose of the newly-established SDDS is to "guide IMF members in the provision to the
public of comprehensive, timely, accessible, and reliable economic and financial statistics in a
world of increasing economic and financial integration."'136 As such, the SDDS comprises
four elements: (i) coverage, periodicity, and timeliness of data; (ii) access by the public; (iii)
integrity of the disseminated data; and (iv) quality of the disseminated data. 137 While par-
ticipation is optional, countries seeking international capital can be expected to comply in
order to meet investor demands for comparable information on competing countries.
B. THE GROUP OF TEN AND THE RESOWLTON OF SOVEREIGN LiQuIDry CIsEs.
Following an invitation by the Group of Seven to the Group of Ten in Halifax in
June 1995, the Deputies of the G-10 established a Working Party to consider the issues aris-
ing with respect to the orderly resolution of sovereign liquidity crises.138 On 22 April 1996,
the Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten nations released a communiqu6 on inter-
national financial emergencies such as the Mexican Peso Crisis based on and endorsing the
Working Party Report'139
134. See Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 63 (citing Lawrence Summers, Summers on
Mexico, Ten Lessons to Learn, EcoNOMIsT, Dec 23,1995, at 62).
135. See IMF Executive Board Approves the Special Data Dissemination Standard, IMF PRESS Rel no.
96/18 (Apr. 16, 1996). At an early stage it was decided that two sets of standards should be cre-
ated, and work is continuing on the General Data Dissemination Standard applicable to all
members, of which a proposal is to be considered in late 1996. Id
136. Id.
137. See lW Standards for The Dissemination by Countries of Economic and Financial Statistics: The
Special Data Dissemination Standard (April 1996), available on Interne at gopher://gopher-
imf.org. As part of the IMF's efforts at dissemination and timeliness, all data is to be available
on the Data Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB) by the end of August 1996.
138. WORING PAlR, supra note 128, at 32-34.
139. Group of Ten, COMMUNIQUE OF MINISTES AND GOVERNORS OF THE GROUP OF TEN NATIONS ON
INTERNAIONAL FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES, Apr 22, 1996, reprinted in WORLD SEcs. L. REP. (BNA),
Apr. 28, 1996, at 32. thereinafter, G-10].
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1. The G-1O Communiqu6
In its Communiqu4, the G-10 noted the ongoing discussion between the G-10
countries and other countries aimed at developing new financing arrangements which
would double the supplementary resources available to IMF under the GAB for coping with
these sorts of international financial emergencies. 140 The G-0 affirmed that, given the
need to contain moral hazard and the desirability of equitable burden-sharing, first, that
neither the debtor countries nor their private creditors should expect to be insulated from
any adverse financial consequences of their financial decisions by the provision of large-
scale official financing in the event of a crisis, and second, that there should be no presump-
tion that any type of debt would be exempt from payments suspensions or restructurings in
any future sovereign liquidity crisis.14 1 Importantly, the G-10 stated that the current flexi-
ble, case-by-case practices and procedures, as developed over the years, are an appropriate
starting point for considering how to respond to future sovereign liquidity crises, and that
improvements should continue to evolve to meet the needs of specific crises, and stressed
that improvements should be lead by private sector groups in developing any new contrac-
tual arrangements. 142 Further, they affirmed that the official community's primary role in
the resolution of sovereign liquidity crises should remain centered on "the promotion of
strong and effective adjustment by debtor countries in the context of IMF-supported pro-
grams,"143 thereby indicating the continued importance of IMF conditionality and struc-
tural adjustment programs.
The G-10 expressed support for the work of international financial organizations
such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), welcomed efforts to increase cooperation among author-
ities responsible for the supervision and stability of financial markets, and conduded that
such organizations provide a helpful basis for further work in this area.144 The G-10 also
emphasized the importance of adherence to "credible and consistent economic policies"
and endorsed actions to reinforce market discipline through the establishment of data dis-
semination standards by IMF, along with the strengthening of surveillance procedures. 145
2. The Working Party Report.
In carrying out its work, the Working Party sought to give the highest priority to
measures that will help prevent crises from occurring, sought to endorse efforts already
underway in other forums to improve market discipline and strengthen the surveillance of
sovereign borrowers' economic performance, and attached particular importance to the
need for sovereign borrowers to make "timely changes" in their economic policies if condi-
tions change in ways that may lead to reductions in capital inflows. 146
140. Ird para. 1.
141. Id para. 3. This latter statement seems directly aimed at holders of LDC bond debt. See infra,
section V.
142. Id. para. 4.
143. Id.
144. Id. para. 5.
145. Id See supra Section W.A.
146. WoRKING PARTY, supra note 128, para 1.
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In considering the means to deal with future sovereign liquidity crises, the
Working Party concluded that no pre-set procedure could be suitable to all cases; however,
it did identify a broad set of desirable principles and features that provide a framework for
the development of procedures for handing sovereign liquidity crises in a flexible, case-by-
case approach.147 Any such procedure should have the following features:148 (i) foster
sound economic policies by all debtors; (ii) minimize moral hazard for both creditors and
debtors; (iii) rely on market forces and not interfere with the efficient operation of sec-
ondary markets in relevant debt instruments; (iv) limit contagion from one debtor's prob-
lems to other countries; (v) support credible and sustainable actions and not impose exces-
sive social, political, or economic costs on the debtor; (vi) seek to ensure that burdens asso-
ciated with the provision of exceptional financing are allocated fairly and within and across
different classes of creditors; (vii) strengthen the ability of governments to resist pressures
to assume responsibility for the external liabilities of their private sectors; (viii) be suitable
for quick and flexible use in a variety of different cases; (ix) be cooperative and non-con-
frontational, and promote the adoption by debtors and creditors of arrangements to facili-
tate resolution of liquidity crises; (x) build on existing contractual or other arrangements
that facilitate the resolution of crises; and (xi) make use of existing practices and institu-
tions. In terms of policy, the official community's interest in containing systemic risk and
its role as a lender to sovereign borrowers means that the official community has a stake,
and therefor a role to play, in fostering cooperative efforts by debtors and creditors to con-
tend with unexpected payments problems. 149
The Working Party reached seven broad conclusions in its report.150 First, it is
essential as a basic principle that the terms and conditions of all debt contracts are to be met
in full and that market discipline must be preserved.' 5' In exceptional cases, however,.a
temporary suspension of debt payments by the debtor may be unavoidable as a part of the
process of crisis resolution and as a way of gaining time to put in place a credible adjust-
ment program.'- 2 Second, neither debtor countries nor their creditors should expect to be
insulated from adverse financial consequences by the provision of lage-scale official financ-
ing in the event of a crisis,153 as markets are equipped to assess the risks involved in lending
to sovereign borrowers and to set the prices and other terms of the instruments accordingly,
and no type of debt will be exempt from future problems and solutions.154 Third, current
practices and procedures emphasizing the importance of adjustment efforts of the debtor
country and placing principal responsibilities for work-outs on the private participants are
147. IU para. 4. This approach should be taken in light of the conditions prevailing at the time, the
nature and intensity of the crisis, and the circumstances of the debtor. Id
148. Id.
149. Id para. 5.
150. Id para. 2.
151. Id.
152. Id. The Working Party did not consider that it would be feasible to operate any formal mecha-
nism for signalling the official community's approval of a suspension of payments by the
debtor. Id, para. 9.
153. The Working Party concluded, however, that it is not possible or desirable to preclude official
involvement altogether in the event of a serious crisis, albeit short of the creation of an interna-
tional bankruptcy forum. Id., para. 5.
154. 1d, para. 2.
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an appropriate starting point, and improvements should be evolutionary.155 The practices
are based on the implementation of an IMF-supported sustainable adjustment program as
a major precondition for the cooperative resolution of any crisis.156 Fourth, international
bankruptcy procedures do not appear to provide, either currently or in the foreseeable
future, "a feasible or appropriate way" of dealing with sovereign liquidity cises.1 57 Fifth,
further consideration should be given in "appropriate forums"158 to ways in which the
financial systems in emerging market economies could be strengthened in order to reduce
the risks they might pose in the event of a sovereign liquidity crisis. 159 The Working Party
recognized that structural weaknesses in the banking systems of debtor countries could
seriously aggravate liquidity crises and might pose difficulties for financial systems in lender
countries. 160 Sixth, a market-led process to develop for inclusion in sovereign debt instru-
ments contractual provisions that facilitate consultation and cooperation between debtors
and their private creditors, as well as within the creditor community, in the event of a crisis
would be desirable. 16 1 Seven, it would be advisable for the IMF to review existing policy in
regard to lending support prior to full and final resolution of sovereign borrower arrears to
private creditors and to consider whether the scope of its application should be extended to
other forms of debt not now covered, "while remaining mindful of the need for prudence
155. Id According to the Working Party, current practices were developed over the course fo the past
few decades to contend with real world problems in a pragmatic and flexible manner. Further,
they are volutary and make use of market information and market forces. These practices
recognise the distinct perspectives of the three main actors involved in a crisis, i.e., the official
community, private creditors, and the sovereign debtor, as well as their common interest in the
orderly resolution of any crisis. The practices involve national authorities and multilateral
institutions but place principal responsibility on the individual debtor and its creditors. Id,
para. 6.
156. Id.
157. Id The Working Party did note that further study by "private sector entities" may be warranted.
Id According to the Working Party, sovereign debtors have not in the past had a strong need for
legal protection against creditors, and moreover, they could not be forced to submit to the juris-
diction of a bankruptcy forum. Id, para. 5.
158. This would presumably mean, at a minimum, the Basle Committee, IOSCO, and IMF
159. WoRKnG PARTY, supra note 128, para 2.
160. Md para. 7.
161. Id para. 2. Such market initiatives would deserve "official support" as "appropriate' Id The
Working Party took the view that certain contractual provisions governing debt contracts can
facilitate the resolution of a crisis by fostering dialogue and consultation between the sovereign
debtor and its creditors and among creditors, and by reducing the incentive for, or ability of, a
small number of dissident creditors to disrupt, delay, or prevent arrangements to support a
credible adjustment programme that is acceptable to the vast majority of concerned parties.
Such provisions include, inter alia, those that (i) provide for the collective representation of
debt holders in the event of crisis, (ii) allow for qualified majority voting to alter the terms and
conditions of debt contracts, and (iii) require the sharing among creditors of assets received
from the debtor. The Working Party noted that in fact such clause have been employed in a
limited number of contracts. Id., para. 8.
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and the maintenance of strict conditionality."162 According to the Working Party, such
lending can both signal confidence in the debtor country's policies and longer-term
prospects and indicate to unpaid creditors that their interests would be best served by
quickly reaching an agreement with the debtor.163
The Working Party reached the overall condusion that there is no need to change
current procedures for official bilateral credits and long-term bank claims. 164 It did, how-
ever, recognize that there is a need for the principles and procedures for handling sovereign
liquidity crises to take into account the new importance of debt in the form of securities
and the growing likelihood that some such debt may have to be subject to renegotiation in
the future. 165 As for the official community, while it may be able to facilitate dialogue and
assist in data collection, the Working Party concluded that market participants should make
the decisions regarding any innovations in contractual provisions: "The official communi-
ty's primary role in the resolution of sovereign liquidity crises should remain centered on
the promotion of strong and effective adjustment by debtor countries in the context of
IMF-supported programs, which would need to take into account any recourse to tempo-
rary suspensions of payments."166
V. Debt Crises and Liquidity Crises.
If a debtor has liquidity problems and cannot meet its debt obligations, the debtor
usually needs to borrow in order to maintain debt payments and ongoing financial opera-
tions, even in cases where debt is rescheduled. 167 Although such a situation may affect or
even threaten the international financial system and the domestic economy of the country
experiencing problems, a debt crisis is in reality simply a breakdown in contractual relations
between two parties, namely a debtor and its creditors. Unfortunately, the same political
pressures that restrained banks from initiating lawsuits and pushed them into debt resched-
ulings during the 1980s and forced unwilling banks to lend more to debtor governments are
unlikely to be present in the future, and today, bondholders would in all probability refuse
to increase their exposure based upon their holdings of international debt 168
162. Id. para. 2. Although the Working Party rejected any formal international approval of a suspen-
sionof debt payments, it concluded that it would be advisable for IMF Executive Board to con-
sider extending the scope of its current policy of lending, in exceptional circumstances, to a
country that faces the prospect of continuing to accumulate arrears on some of its contractual
debt-service obligations to private sector creditors, in cases where the country is undertaking a
strong adjustment programme and making reasonable efforts to negotiate with its creditors.
i, para. 9.
163. Id.
164. Id. para. 10.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Debt Work-out System, supra note 123, at 104
168. Id. See generally, MacMillan, supra note 7: Power, supra note 7, for excellent analyses of the
development of the law in this area.
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In this context, the Peso Crisis is illustrative of the situation that a sovereign may
find itself it in: as the Peso Crisis commenced, the Mexican government had approximately
$90 billion of debt outstanding. 169
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF DEBT CRISES.
Debt crises arise in different ways: in the Peso Crisis, the local currency was sud-
denly massively devalued against the U.S. dollar,170 while the 1982 Debt Crisis was caused
by rising interest rates, causing the external debt burden to be more expensive while falling
commodity prices reduced foreign currency reserves form export earnings.' 7' Debt crises
may be the result of liquidity crises, 172 as well as the result of factors beyond the countries'
control, such as the various oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. 173
Debt crises are not new phenomena: in the 19th century, Latin America experi-
enced a number of such crises. 174 Starting in the early 1820s, an enormous amount of
loans to Latin American states from British investors was followed by mass defaults
throughout the middle of the 19th century.175 Without a legal remedy, bondholders were
forced to develop procedures by which they might negotiate payment of some of the
169. INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 62.
170. By the end of March 1995, the new peso had fallen by almost 50% in foreign currency terms
since the exchange rate was allowed to float in December 1994. WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 39
IMF ANNUAL REPo~r (Oct. 1995).
171. According to Morgan Guaranty Bank, in 1982, the ratio of debt service payments to exchange
was 179% in Argentina, 129% in Mexico, 122% in Brazil, 116% in Chile, and 95% in Venezuela
(the five largest debtors). International Lending: Implications of a Slowdown, WORLD FIN.
MARKS (Oct. 1982), at 1, tbl. 5. By 1982, the ratio of debts to exports of goods and services
had reached 144%, and their ratio of debt to GDP had reached 36%. E. Brau, et al, Recent
Multilateral Debt Reschedulings with Official Bank Creditors, IMF Occasional Paper No. 25,
(1983), at 4, tbl. 1.
172. When a country's foreign reserves run low or the cost of its debt increases, debt payments
become more difficult As the problem becomes more serious, lenders become less willing to
lend, thereby increasing the problems of the afflicted LDC. See Debt Work-out System, supra
note 124, at 62.
173. See World Economic Outlook (IMF Occasional Paper No. 21 (1983), at 56-57. See also, Vito
Tanzi, Fiscal Poliy Responses to Exogenous Shocks in Developing Countries, 76 AM. ECON. Rev. 88
(1986), at 89-90.
174. See Frank Dawson, THE FIRsT IAN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS THE CITY OF LONDON AND THE 1822-
1825 LOAN BUBBLE 197 (1990); see also, SEC REPoir ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, AcTIvInEs, PERSONNEL AND FuNCT7IONS OF PROTCFIVE AND RORGANIZATION COMMITTEES,
Pt.V (1937), at 120-142.
175. See generally, Dawson, supra note 174, chs VI-K. Creditors at this time had no enforceable legal
remedies at the time due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and local Latin American
investors would not entertain suits against their states. Debt Work-out System, supra note 124,
at 81. In the U.S. sovereign immunity was in effect until as late as 1951. See generally Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116, 135-46 (1812) (without a waiver, sovereign immunity is a
defense). The Tate Letter in 1952 changed the policy to a more restrictive policy of sovereign
immunity, denying immunity for a sovereign's commercial activities. See Jack Tate, LETIER
FROM THE ACTING LEGAL ADVISOR TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (May 25, 1952), reprinted in 26
DE'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
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defaulted debt, namely through the creation of bondholder councils. 176
During the early part of the 20th century, foreign governments began to issue large
amounts of bonds in the U.S., and again, enormous defaults occurred, particularly during
the 1930s, with American creditors being forced to resort to similar measures to those used
in the earlier defaults.'7 7 Unfortunately, bondholder committees were only as effective as
the amount of bonds entrusted to them as their power was essentially only in relation to
their negotiating strength with the defaulting governments' 7 8 Finally, while bondholders
sometimes pursued remedies through issuing banks, banks tended to remain loyal to the
issuers rather than to the bondholders.179
During the prolonged Debt Crisis of the 1980s, the structure of the debt made it
relatively easy for lenders to emerge which guided the creditor banks in the debt negotia-
tions: the vast majority of the debt was in the form of syndicated bank loans, and the com-
mercial banks therefore effectively had representatives which negotiated the debt with the
governments. Countries invited the banks to negotiate by forming an advisory committee,
with Bank Advisory Committees ("BACs"), consisting of the lead banks which had orga-
nized the syndicated loans, emerging. These were informal groups'5 0 that represented the
creditors and gave advice to the country on how best to progress with the restructuring in
the interests of what might be acceptable to the wider banking community, and obtained
cooperation among the hundreds of creditor banks by making recommendations for a
restructuring which they then imposed using their political leverage.
The debt restructuring programs of the 1980s were usually carried out in conjunc-
tion with IMF-sponsored economic stabilization and adjustment programs. Most of the
countries that have come through the restructuring process, therefore, have done so with
economies that have benefited from major structural reforms. Although the reforms gener-
ally mandated are not necessarily completely defeasible,18 1 they at least reflect what
investors search for in deciding to invest in an LDC market, although arguably at the same
time present just the sort of consequences experienced by Mexico.
176. For a description of the development of these mechanisms, see "Debt Work- out System" supra
note 124, at 81-83.
177. Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 83. See SEC Report, supra note 173, at 120-42.
178. See SEC Report, supra note 173, at 220 ("Control over deposited bonds and possession of prox-
ies are obviously evidence of authority").
179. Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 84; see SEC Report, at 512-3 1.
180. "The formation and role of a bank advisory group is informal and without legal recognition,
either as a matter of contract or as a matter of law." Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure:
A Perspective of Counsel to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 59 (1984), at 64.
181. See Paul Krugman, Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/Aug 1995, at 28.
Krugman describes the so-called "Washington Consensus" regarding LDC economic policies
that developed in the early 1990s as: "Liberlize trade, privatize state enterprises, balance the
budget, peg the exchange rate, and one will have laid the foundations for an economic takeoff,
find a country that has done these things, and there one may confidently expect to realize high
returns on investmentsW ' Id. at 29.
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B. INTERNATIONAL LENDING TODAY.
The circumstances under which cross-border lending takes place today are signifi-
candy different from cross-border lending activities twenty years ago. One consequence of
this is that the resolution of future LDC debt problems, if such problems recur, may also be
very different from the methods used to resolve the 1982 Debt Crisis. The integration of
the world's financial markets over the last twenty years is perhaps the single most important
change in cross-border lending, with money flowing into and out of economies with
incredible speed, as graphically demonstrated by the Mexican Peso Crisis. 182 Any diminu-
tion in investor confidence can be reflected in massive and immediate shifts of capital to the
detriment of the LDC borrower.183 In this new era of rapidly shifting capital, borrowers are
expected to internalise these lessons, at least in theory; however, there are at least two prob-
lematic factors: 184 first, despite the efforts of developing countries to distance themselves in
the minds of investors from those LDCs experiencing problems, the markets tend not to be
very discriminating in this regard, as clearly demonstrated by the so-called "tequila
effect"185; and second, Western-educated bureaucrats have risen to prominence in many
countries, and while these individuals understand the economic prerequisites thought nec-
essary to attract foreign capital, the challenge in at least some LDCs is to convince the
domestic population that these longer-term objectives are in fact worth enduring despite
potentially severe near-term sacrifices. I86
Overall, historical cycles of cross-border lending have not all been alike. A number
of factors illustrate the differences between the current cross-border capital flows and those
occurring in the 1970s. Factors indude differences in the nature of investors, instruments,
and borrowers, interest rate bases, use of proceeds, economic reforms, available informa-
tion, remedies, and disdosure. 187 Most of the lending to LDCs during the 1970s took the
form of syndicated commercial bank loans, with banks intermediating petrodollars and
182. See Michael R Sesit, Mexico's Economic Troubles a Reminder of Risks in Emerging Market
Investments WALL ST. J., Dec. 28,1994, at Cl, col. 1.
183. See Jonathan Friedland, Peso Crisis Highlights Diminished Roles of IME, World Bank in Latin
America, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1995, at A13, col. 3; Fidler, More Liberal Flows of Funds Creates
Instability, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at 4, col. 1; Carrington, Private Capital Flows Can Hurt Poor
Nations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at Al, col. 5.
184. Buchheit, supra note 8, at 55.
185. See Latin America in the Fallout Zone, ECONOMIST, Jan 7, 1995, at 59; Floyd Norris, Mexican
Shadow Falls on Emerging Markets, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1995, at D 1, col. 2.
186. See Anthony DePalma, After the Fall: 2 Faces of Mexico's Economy, NY. TIMES, July 16, 1995, at 1,
Sec. 3, col. 1.
187. See Buchheit, supra note 8, at 47-54.
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flight capital between Euromarket depositors and the ultimate LDC borrowers, many of
whom funded the flow of petrodollars in the first place. In contrast, cross-border lending in
the 1990s has taken place and probably will continue to take place through the mechanism
of the international bond markets.188 In contrast to the potentially systemic consequences
of LDC default on commercial bank debt in the 1980s, if future events force issuers to
default on these bonds en masse, many investors might lose their money but the full weight
of the problem will not fall on the commercial banks, their regulators, and their govern-
ment sponsored deposit insurance agencies.189
Today, unsecured, medium-term, commercial bank syndicated loans are much less
common, at least in the context of LDC financing,190 although this may be changing some-
what.191 While syndicated loans were often rescheduled during the 1980s, publicly issued
bonds were almost never rescheduled during the Debt Crisis.192 Although investors in the
1990s seem to take some comfort from this recent practice of excluding bonds from the
unpleasantries of debt reschedulings, the main reason why bonds were not rescheduled in
the 1980s was that there were not very many of them, and moreover, many sovereign bor-
rowers also felt that by maintaining punctual debt servicing of outstanding bonds, interna-
tional bond markets could be kept available for an eventual re-entry of sovereign borrowers
to the international capital markets. 193 While this recent reluctance to reschedule has in
fact encouraged investors in these sorts of instruments, 194 these instruments are certainly
not free from risks of default, as has been shown by the history of international bond issues
by developing countries. Because bank loans are now less common and bonds have
become the lending instrument of choice in LDC financing, a borrower that experiences
financial difficulties in the future may find that its outstanding bond debt is simply too
large to be ignored or excluded from a request for debt relief, and the mechanics of this
process have been the subject of some debate.195
While until the middle of the 20th century, a lender extending credit to a foreign
sovereign did so with no expectation that he could compel repayment of the debt by legal
means, today creditor countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. recognise a restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity under which sovereigns engaged in commercial activity abroad may
be sued in the national courts of other countries. 196 Moreover, drafters of credit agree-
188. Id. at 47; Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 80. See WORLD BANK, WoRLD DEBT TABLES
1993-94 (1993), at 20-22 [hereinafter 1993-94 WoRLD DEBT TABLES].
189. See Buchheit, supra note 8, at 48.
190. See 1993-94 DEBT TABLES, supra note 188 at 25 ("As in previous years, access to syndicated bank
credit was severely restricted for developing countries that had experienced, or are experienc-
ing, debt-servicing difficulties").
191. See Joseph J. Norton, International Syndicated Lending: The Legal Context for Economic
Development in Latin America, NAFTA L & Bus. Rsv. 21,21-24 (Summer 1996).
192. The Eurobonds and floating rate note issues of most countries were consciously excluded from
the rescheduling exercises and were paid on time in full Buchheit, supra note 7, at 48.
193. Id. at 49.
194. These sentiments are reflected in the publications of major investment banks See Buchheit,
supra note 8. at 48. n. 17.
195. See Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, supra note 7.
196. For example, in the US., the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is codified in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, and in the U.K in the State Immunity Act 1978.
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ments and bond indentures for sovereign borrowers and government-owned enterprises
routinely include express waivers of any immunities to which the borrowers may be enti-
tled 197 While lenders could have attempted to litigate a solution to the last debt crisis, this
was not the solution chosen. 198 If debt problems recur in LDCs in the future, it is not at all
clear that negotiated settlements could be acheived without the real threat of litigation by
some creditors, 199 despite the arguments that publidy-issued bonds will be treated as a pre-
ferred category of debt and serviced faithfully even if other obligations go into default 200
C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS.
Three factors would make debt rescheduling more difficult in a bond crisis
today.20 1 First, it is unlikely that the systemic implications to the international banking
industry will be repeated in a sufficient manner to produce pressure on creditors to
reschedule en masse Second, bondholders may hope that offidal sources will provide the
necessary liquidity to enable their bonds to be paid in full without a rescheduling. Third,
maverick bondholder litigation will almost certainly cause problems. 202
According to one commentator, however, in future sovereign debt crises, potential-
ly resulting from sovereign liquidity crises, debt reschedulings are inevitable simply because
197. See Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 72.
198. See Avoiding the Nightmare Solution, INT'L FIN'L L. REv., Aug. 1992, at 19. Several reasons have
been advanced to explain this forbearance: the brotherhood of bankers, the fear of prompting
a raised eyebrow of disapproval by one's regulator, and a recognition that any widespread resort
to lawsuits would jeopardise the renegotiation process and force borrowers into a "bunker"
mentality. Buchheit, supra note 8, at 53. Legally, the banks could have brought suits over their
loans: New York or English law usually controlled the agreements, and neither of these coun-
tries apply foreign sovereign immunity to sovereign bonds. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
In-, 504 U.S. 607, 617-19 (1992); see also, George R. Delaume, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act and Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years Later, 88 Am. 1. INT'L L. 257 (1994); George R.
Delaume, Sovereign Immunity and Public Debt, 23 INrr'L LAw. 811 (1989). The nature of syndi-
cated lending further hindered banks from suing on the debt because it is very difficult for
member banks to take unilateral action due to contractual provisions, such as sharing clauses
generally contained in the agreements. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Sharing Clause as a Litigation
Shield, INT'L FIN. L Ray., Oct. 1990, at 15.
199. Overall, the arguments against "pressing the button'" while other opportunities to recover the
debt remain unexplored, are probably persuasive "Latin American Debt Obligations in the
1990s: Risk Strategies: Remedies and Judicial Enforcement," 16 NW. J. Intl L. & Bus. 5, 7-8
(1995). Note that under Mexican law, a currency devaluation is not considered an act of God or
force majeure. Id. at 12.
200. See Buchheit, supra note 8, at 53-54.
201. See Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 71-72.
202. Bondholders can expect to obtain judgements in US. and/or U.K courts. See Macmillan, The
Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, supra note 7. This is fact started to occur and is likely to increase in
frequency. Id
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there is no alternative since private lending will simply become unavailable.203 Other sorts
of public 20 4 and private finance205 are also unlikely to yield support Given these realities,
the current legal and institutional framework for handling a sovereign debt restructuring
has been described as "embarrassing unprepared" to handle the "enormous amount of
bonds spread across a vast international market of different types of investors:' 206
Rory MacMillan has suggested that such a work-out system must accomplish two
goals: first, it must enable creditors and debtors to negotiate debt reschedulings whereby
the timing of payments is postponed or debt reduction whereby the burden of debt is
reduced; and second, it must make new lending to the debtor country possible so as to pro-
vide liquidity and restoring it to immediate debt servicing capability.207 Further, three
problems must be addressed in setting up such a debt renegotiation system: 208 (i) with
most sovereign debt taking the form of bonds, there are no obvious parties to play a leader-
ship role when a crisis arises; (ii) there is no coordination mechanism for the large number
and variety of ever-changing creditors to act together; and (iii) even if there were such lead-
ership and coordination, creditors have no individual incentive to act together because they
lack a solidarity of interests.
Because the vast majority of sovereign debt now takes the form of bonds rather
than loans, in a crisis there will be no provision for coordinated representation and leader-
ship. Further, it would be very hard to impose political pressures similar to those imposed
on lead banks in the 1980s; moreover, bondholders are not bound together in the same way
as lenders organized into loan syndicates. 20 9 Even if a mechanism existed to organize
bondholders to act together, collective decisions are not necessarily in their individual inter-
ests since no creditor wants to take a loss, the idea being that if some creditors reschedule
their debt, those creditors which retain the face value of their debt will "free ride" because
the rescheduling increases liquidity and enables the free riders to be paid at face value.210
This problem plagued the debt negotiations during the 1980s, but in the first few years the
203. Debt Work-out System, Supra note 124, at 59 The banks are unlikely to lend to LDCs experienc-
ing problems after their experiences following the 1982 Debt Crisis. Id. This was demonstrated
in the Peso Crisis when commercial banks were asked by the U.S. government to participate in
the rescue plan, but their portion never materialised. See Richard Waters & Leslie Crawford,
Banks Pull Out of $3bn Role in Mexican Rescue, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at 20; Timothy
O'Brien, Prospects Look Dim for Bank Loan to Mexico, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1995, at A3.
204. The US. government is unlikely to respond as it did to the Peso Crisis in the future. Further,
IMF has stated that it will not intervene. See generally G- 10, Section III. B. and note 137, supra.
205. Mexico was unable to return to international capital markets for 6 months after the onset of the
crisis, with the first issue of Mexican sovereign debt not coming until July 1995. Leslie
Crawford, Mexican Bonds Welcomed, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 1995, at 3. See also, Daniel Dombey,
Mexico to Restructure Debt Through $500m Bond Issue, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at 4.
206. Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 59-60.
207. Id. at 60.
208. Id.
209. In particular, bonds do not contain sharing clauses See id. at 73.
210. Id at 70.
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lead banks were able to exert pressure in order to quell opposition.2 11 Further, the syndicat-
ed loans intended to provide new money involved all the creditors in a single agreement,
thus providing strong creditor solidarity and less scope for individual litigation on the part
of any single creditor.2 12
Proposals have begun to emerge for a workable solution to future sovereign debt
crises. One suggestion has come from Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs who has suggested
that governments set up a sort of international bankruptcy regime for debtor
governments. 213 The problem with Sachs' solution, as noted by the G- 10, is that it looks to
the international institutions such as IMF and the World Bank as an answer: while such a
solution seems like the obvious starting point, such a solution could potentially threaten the
sovereignty of LDCs by giving the IMF the power to decide when a country would declare a
moratorium on its debt 2 14 Further, giving the IMF such legal powers would also revolu-
tionise international financial law, with debt instruments governed by New York or English
law suddenly being subject to the uncertainties of the international political order, as the
IMF may be subject to unpredictable political influence at the hands of its member govern-
ments.2 15 Finally, apart from being politically unacceptable, a sovereign debt workout man-
ager is in all likelihood unnecessary.216
At the other end of the spectrum from the Sachs proposal is a proposal by James
Hurlock, a lawyer at White & Case.217 Hurlock suggests that problems of maverick bond-
holders could be dealt with by dosing the courts to such investors through the amending of
sovereign immunity laws so that a sovereign debtor would be immune from law suits in the
211. 1d.
212. Id. at 71.
213. See id. at 76-77 (citing Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?.
(unpublished manuscript, 1995)). Under Sachs' proposal, such a system would give the IMF
legal powers analogous to a bankruptcy judge in U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings. The IMF would
have the legal authority to declare a moratorium on debt payments, stop legal proceedings, and
organise debt workouts. Such a system would reapportion losses to the market, providing a
less expensive solution to governments than publicly funded IMF bailouts, and the problems of
leadership, coordination, and solidarity could all be solved and imposed by the IM.
214. Id. at 77-78. For this reason, MacMillan suggests that IMF's role should be limited to providing
temporary liquidity and conditional structural adjustment programs. Id. at 78.
215. The laws of these jurisdictions are typically chosen for their sophistication and predictability
216. See G-10, supra note 137.
217. James Hurlock, The Way Ahead for Sovereign Debt, EUROMONEY, Aug 1995, at 78-79. Hurlock
argues that the problems of leadership and coordination are not significant because corporate
debt work-outs are largely "self-executing in that creditors, in concert with the debtor, collec-
tively determine the economic terms upon which the enterprise will be restructured, and that
bankruptcy judges in fact play a peripheral role in reorganizations. He argues that a debt work-
out system does not necessarily require any international institution to play a central role
because the difficulties consist of fundamental mechanical problems which do not need gov-
ernmental supervision, and that in fact debtors and creditors can reach restructuring agree-
ments successfully without official intervention. The real problem, then, is solidarity, i.e. the
danger of the maverick bondholder disrupting the negotiations by suing.
64 NAFrA.- Law and Business Review of the 
Americas
midst of a negotiated work-out. Such an approach has been critidsed for two reasons:218
first, the problems of leadership and coordination are probably much more serious than
Hurlock suggest, given the likely complexity of the next sovereign debt crisis; and second,
amending sovereign immunities laws in this fashion could create serious moral hazard
problems as it could foreseeably bring about a return to the pattern of defaults seen during
the 19th and early 20th century.
Other proposals include that of Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes of the
Centre for Economic Policy Research who suggest a three-pronged work-out system, 219 and
that of Rory Macmillan based on historical experiences with bondholder councils in the 19th
and 20th centuries. 220 Overall, both the Eichengreen/Portes proposal and Macmillan's pro-
posal are well-thought out, but nonetheless seems to require intelligent and coordinated
action by the major creditor country governments - something that may or may not be
possible; however, it nonetheless seems largely in line with the thiniing of the G- 10.
D. PRIVATE DEBT
Investors in the 1990s have a preference for private sector borrowers,22 1 and the
balance of payments financings for sovereign borrowers that characterized the late 1970s
are now distinctly out of favor. Private sector borrowers, however, are likely to be caught in
218. See Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 79.
219. Barry Eichengreen, et al, Crisis, What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors, (Council
for Economic Policy Research, Sept. 1995. First, in order to address the problem of coordina-
tion, they endorse the idea of creating one or more bondholder councils which, with the help of
a mediation or conciliation service, would negotiate debt reschedulings on behalf of bondhold-
ers. Second, they suggest that the lack of solidarity could be solved by an ex ante solution: if the
legal provisions of future bonds allowed a majority of bondholders to negotiate changes in the
essential terms of the bonds, eg., maturity date, coupon payment date, principal and interest
amounts, etc., then bondholder councils could negotiate effectively with the sovereign debtor.
Third, they endorse the strengthening of the IMF's ability to provide emergency financing and
encourage it to play a legitimising role for countries wishing to renegotiate their debts.
220. Debt Work-out System, supra note 124, at 86-94. See also, Rory MacMillan, New Lease on Life for
Bondholder Councils, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at 11. Under his proposal, U.S. and U.K- legisla-
tion would be altered so that indenture trustees would be allowed for sovereign issues, thereby
gaining the benefits provided by the lead banks during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s. Further, to
deal with the coordination problem, national bondholder councils would be set up in the major
issuing jurisdictions, namely the U.S. and the U.K., funded by fees form the issuing of bonds and
from rescheduling efforts. Finally, to deal with the solidarity problem, Macmillan suggests, inter
alia, that rather than granting complete immunity to debtors as in the Hurlock proposal, legisla-
tion might be used to vest bondholders rights collectively and exclusively in the bondholder
council, but only during debt crises officially declared by either the country of IME Id. at 94-
104.
221. See 1993 PRIVATE MAdutrr FiNcINc, at 19. Private sector issuers accounted for an increasing
share of developing country bond issues in 1992, representing 42% of total issuance activity;
compared with 31% in 1991 and 8% in 1989. IMF, ITRNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, PART II:
SYSTEMIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANcE (1993), at 50. See also, Wolf, Private Capital Flows
After Mexico, FIN. TMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at 22, col. 5 ("In 1993, 95 per cent of net private finance
flowed to the private sector, while 70 per cent of net long-term flows to developing countries
were from private sources to private users, up from 45 per cent in 1990.).
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any problems that their sovereign experiences, and accessing assets located abroad may not
be as easy as it may appear at first glance. A private sector entity, particularly one that has
its own reliable source of foreign currency earnings, may be perfectly creditworthy when
viewed in isolation; however, the company may find itself in a predicament as a result of its
location in a country whose aggregate foreign exchange inflows are insufficient to pay for
the country's necessary imports and external debt service. As a consequence, even the most
solvent private sector company may find itself drawn into its government's external debt
difficulties, despite its own best efforts. For this reason, rating agencies have long recog-
nized that even the most creditworthy private sector borrower cannot resist its govern-
ment's call for a centralization of foreign exchange nor can it avoid being swept up in its
government's debt problems.222
Unlike the predominantly syndicated bank lending of the late 1970s, directed
mostly to sovereign and state owned or guaranteed enterprises, private sector borrowers
have been the principal beneficiaries of private capital flows in the 1990s. 2 2 3 For this rea-
son, the external debt position of private sector borrowers will be a centerpiece of concern
should liquidity problems occur in an emerging market.224 The precarious position of pri-
vate sector borrowers was highlighted by the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95.
At the beginning of 1995, outstanding Mexican Eurobonds totalled, collectively,
approximately $20 billion, of which approximately $13 billion had been issued by private
sector Mexican companies. 225 As the Mexican devaluation commenced, the Mexican cor-
porate sector also had substantial foreign currency-denominated bank debt and short-term
222. This is commonly known as "sovereign ceiling," the rating agencies' shorthand expression for
the proposition that no private sector borrower in a developing country can achieve an external
debt rating higher than that of its own sovereign unless the transaction is structured so as to
intercept an off-shore stream of foreign currency revenue for the benefit of the debtholders, or
through some other special circumstance insulating the company from the effects of the sover-
eign See Taylor, Securitizations Can Overcome 'Sovereign Ceiling', in Duff & Phelps Credit
Rating Co., PERSPECTIVES ON EMERGING MARKETS, Jan. 1995, at 5; Apasco Outdoes the Sovereign,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1995, at 20.
223. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES 1994-95, Vol 1, at 10. During the mid- 1980s, only
approximately $14 billion of private sector Mexican corporate debt was restructured. See
Duncan N. Darrow, et al., Restructuring Strategies for Mexican Eurobond Debt 16 NW. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 117 (1995), at 121-123 (discussing the 1980s experiences).
224. Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, Latin American Debt in the 1990s: A New Scenario for
Creditors and Debtors, 16 NW. 1. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1995), at 2. Oddly enough, private sector
borrowers during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s did not really have to worry about this problem.
In many of the countries undergoing a generalised debt rescheduling during the 1980s, formal
programs were established pursuant to which the host government agreed to assume the out-
standing indebtedness of private sector borrowers in return for payment of the local currency
equivalent of the amount due to the central bank or other monetary authority. Over time,
these programs operated to transform most private sector debt into sovereign debt.
225. Cecile Gutscher, Banks, Construction Firms are Mexico's Most Vulnerable, LDC DEBT REPORT, Jan.
23, 1995, at 1. Since 1988, more than 60 Mexican companies have sold dollar-denominated bonds,
primarily in the form of unsecured Eurobonds that are not registered under US. securities laws,
with most issues in the range of $50 million to $200 million, although a few have been in amounts
of $300 million or more. Darrow, supra note 123, at 119, 158-160 (listing in tabular form).
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debt in the form of Euro-commercial paper and Euro-certificates of deposit, which, collec-
tively accounted for another approximately $33 billion of debt 226 Most of these outstand-
ing Eurobond issues will mature, with bullet payments, in the next three years,227 and bar-
ring a substantial improvement in the Mexican economy or the perceived creditworthiness
of Mexican companies, many Mexican issuers will find it difficult to redeem or refinance
their Eurobonds as they mature in the near future.228 The inability of Mexican issuers to
make these payments and to comply with the terms of their debt obligations may trigger a
wave of debt restructuring and workouts long before many of the Eurobond maturity pay-
ments are due.229
Beyond the immediate problems facing Mexico, if liquidity problems again afflict
one or more developing countries, the fate of private sectors borrowers is not dear for sev-
eral reasons.230 First, the stock of private sector debt is far larger today, both in nominal
terms and as a percentage of the overall credit exposure of most countries. Second, the spe-
cial circumstances that induced the governments of the debtor countries to assume or guar-
antee private sector debt in the 1980s probably will not be replicated in the future. Third,
the lenders of the 1990s (principally bondholders) will almost certainly respond differently
to the financial problems of their LDC borrowers than did the lenders of the 1970s and
1980s (principally commercial banks).
While the problems of restructuring private sector debt are not so difficult on a
practical level as those facing sovereign debt, they are nonetheless significant, and indude,
inter alia, consensual out-of-court restructurings with their bondholders or bankruptcy
proceedings in Mexico. 231 The implications, however, bear more on the need for preven-
tion and solution of liquidity crises, the need to strengthen- domestic banking systems, the
need to provide for hedging opportunities, and the need to maintain and increase investor
confidence in the domestic financial system in order to encourage the provision of the
needed capital to prevent unpleasant long-term impacts on the Mexican private sector, as
well as possibly the interests of large holders of Mexican bonds.
226. See Darrow, et al, supra note 223, at 119-120 (citing First National Bank of Chicago and
Mexican Finance Ministry data).
227. In 1995, at least fourteen major issued matured, totalling close to $900 million; in 1996 and
1997, another 25 private sector issues totalling approximately $275 billion will mature; and in
1998, more than 20 additional private sector issues will come due, adding another $3.7 billion.
Id. at 120.
228. Id at 120.
229. A number of these issuers are apparently already in default under the covenants in their
Eurobonds or bank debt, which would give debt holders a legal right to accelerate the debt See
Id. at 144-47.
230. See Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 224, at 3.
231. Overall, Mexican companies and their bondholders are likely to consider alternatives including
temporary covenant relief, partial repayments, posting of collateral, debt-for-debt exchanges,
debt-for-equity exchanges, and/or new equity holders All of these alternatives involve issues of
both Mexican and foreign laws, and all parties involved will probably desire to avoid a Mexican
bankruptcy (quiebra) proceeding if at all possible. See Darrow, supra note 223, at 124-153.
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VI. Conclusions.
Despite the progress to date, Mexico still faces many problems before the Peso
Crisis can be considered resolved. Interest rates continue to be high, the peso continues to
be volatile, the banking sector remains strained, and economic growth is weak. The impli-
cations of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95, however, are much larger than the damage to
Mexico itself.
Capital surges, such as that experienced by Mexico, are likely to be a recurring
threat to developing countries and even to developed countries in the future. Capital flows
are not likely to become any less volatile and international financial institutions are not like-
ly to beceome any more powerful. The key, then, is to look at the Peso Crisis and attempt to
draw lessons from it for the regulation of financial markets.
In general terms, the significance of the Peso Crisis for the broader canvas of
financial regulation is can be seen on three levels: first, the need for regulation to increase
the stability of domestic financial systems in order to allow governments to prevent future
crises and to weather the vagaries of international capital movements; second, the need for
international disclosure and the provision of a sort of lender of last resort; and third, the
potential implications of debt crises in the future that may result from liquidity crises of
from other sources. To a large extent, the international financial players have begun to
answer these questions, but the real test will be the next Mexico- type situation and the
reaction thereto.
Overall, none of these areas implicate any sort of formal law on an international
level, but rather implicate the efforts of international "soft" law providers, such as the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision 232 and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO). 233 These groups have been increasingly cooperating recently,234
and as noted above, their efforts have in fact been commended by the G-10. While neither of
these groups has produced a formal statement regarding the implications of the Peso Crisis
for financial market regulation, their work in increasing financial market stability continues
to be relevant, most especially given the significance that weak domestic banking and finan-
cial systems can have in the development and resolution of sovereign liquidity crises.
In terms of domestic regulation, LDCs need to consider the creation of derivatives
markets to allow both investors and domestic companies to hedge against foreign exchange
risk. At the time leading up to the Peso Crisis, investors did not have access to a reliable
futures or forward market to hedge against currency risk. The effect of this absence of a
futures market in Mexico, given the difficulty in hedging forward positions, heightened the
232. For a complete analysis of the development and role of the Basle Committee in international
and domestic banking supervision, see Joseph J. Norton, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK
SUPERVISORY STANDARDS (1995).
233. For a description of the recent activities of IOSCO, see 1OSCO, ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
234. For a plan and description of cooperative efforts between international organizations such as
the Basle Committee and IOSCO, see BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, RESPONSE OF THE BASLE COMMFITEE
ON BANKING SUPERVISION AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS
To THE REQUEST OF THE G-7 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE JUNE 1995 HAUFAX SUMMIT (MAY
1996).
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perceived risk of investing in Mexico and negatively affected investor confidence. This is an
area that IOSCO is increasingly active in,235 and further, a number of developing countries
including a number of nations in Latin America have already begun the process of develop-
ing domestic derivatives markets.
In terms of international institutions, the IMF, while not taking the lead in the
Peso Crisis as arguably it should have, has been given additional resources to combat these
sorts of problems in the future through the doubling of the GAB. In this regard, two points
should be made. First, the international rescue package was to a large extent successful in
bridging Mexico's liquidity problems and averting a debt crisis. The potential problem,
however, is that responses to these sorts of problems need to be fast, otherwise additional
liquidity is of no avail. To this end, the IMF must act as a sort of lender of last resort in
times of crises, and moreover, it must act quickly. Second, Mexico is one of the largest
recipients of capital flows among all the LDCs. For this reason, a rescue package involving
other LDC should not be of the same magnitude as that required for Mexico, and therefore
the doubling of the GAB will probably be effective, if the IMF is willing to use it with the
requisite speed.
Further, the SDDS should give markets the information necessary to avoid the
panic that can follow a surprise such as occurred in January 1995 with Mexico, and should
also serve to discipline the country's themselves. One explanation why commercial banks
overlent to LDCs during the 1970s is that the banks had remarkably little information
about the economies of the debtor countries, their balance of payments positions, invest-
ment inflows, aggregate external debt, international reserves, etc. High on banks' list of pri-
orities during the ensuing debt restructurings, therefore, were requirements that the sover-
eign borrowers provide the creditors with exceptionally detailed economic information on a
regular basis, and dosely tracking the reports submitted to IMF.2 3 6 For these reasons, the
IMF disclosure standards are a welcome addition.
235. See JOSCO, EMERGING MARKETS COMMITEE, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Exchange
Traded Derivatives, (June 1996).
236. Buchheit, supra note 7, at 52. Most countries that have gone through a generalised debt
rescheduling over the past decade now prepare and distribute booklets to their creditors on a
quarterly basis containing these economic and financial statistics. Note that these reports were
lacking in Mexico due to its seemingly healthy situation.
A new organisation, the Institute of International Finance ("IIF"), was established in 1983 for
the purpose of analysing and reporting to its members on economic and financial develop-
ments in borrowing countries. See Walter Sterling Surrey & Peri N. Nash, Bankers Look Beyond
the Debt Crisis: The Institute of International Finance, Inc., 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. III
(1984).
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Finally, the spector of sovereign debt crises continues to loom, although in a some-
what different form than those of the 1980s. Given the changing climate of international
capital flows, developing countries and perhaps even developed countries are likely to be
increasingly vulnerable to the "discipline" of international capital markets. Importantly,
temporary liquidity crises have the potential to be the source of long-term problems in the
form of debt crises in developing countries. These crises pose their own unique problems
and may or may not require any sort of concerted international solution.238 Nonetheless,
most proposals to date have been flawed, and if arrangements such as the SDDS and the
GAB are insufficient to prevent a future liquidity crisis from developing into a debt crisis, it
is unlikely that any sort of restructuring mechanism will be in place.
237. While international solutions may not be forthcoming, it is worth noting that emerging mar-
kets can in fact take private steps to help to stem the effects of short-term liquidity crises and
hopefully prevent such crises from developing into debt crises Argentina has in fact recently
taken steps in this direction by creating a $3 billion emergency fund to aid domestic banks fac-
ing short-term liquidity problems. The fund is capitalized by a syndicate of international
lenders, with payments for the premiums required being provided by domestic banks and col-
lateralized with the central bank. See Argentina: Payments Bank Liquidity Fund Planned,
EUROMONEY TRADE FINANCE AND BANKER INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 27,1996.
